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Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The
Future of Special Education?
WENDY F. HENSEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many voices over the last decade have called for reform in special
education in American public schools. As the number of those receiving
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA")' has grown,2 scholars and pundits have increasingly argued
that the system not only is failing to meet the needs of many children
with disabilities, but in some cases is actively inflicting harm on them?
Although Congress has attempted with varying success to address such
concerns each time it has amended the IDEA, at least some continue to
believe that the current delivery model cannot effectively meet the high-
ly diverse and at times intense instructional needs that are present across
today's K-12 population. Few dispute that the federal government's fail-
ure to fully fund the mandates of the IDEA has left many schools grap-
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
1.20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (2008).
2. See Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 HASTINGS LJ. 1147, 1149 (2007) (noting the
"indisputable fact" that "the number of children receiving services under the IDEA has skyrock-
eted over the last three decades"). See also Thomas Parrish et al., STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION
FINANCE SYsTEMS, 1999-2000, PAir I1: SPECIAL EDUCATION REvENUEs AND EXPENDrTrRES 5-7
(Center for Special Education Finance 2004) (showing growth in special education students
between 1977-2003).
3. See e.g. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 84 (2003) ("The overidentification of children as disabled
and placing them in special education where they do not belong ... takes valuable resources away
from those that are truly disabled."); Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting Educational
Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2005)
("The disproportionate identification of African-American children with disabilities for special
education under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) persists today to the
extent that the IDEA is viewed as a tool of racial discrimination and a dumping ground for minor-
ity students."). Former Secretary of Education Roderick Page has testified that "[tJhe stigma of
being misclassified as mentally retarded or seriously emotionally disturbed, or as having a behav-
ioral disorder may ... have serious consequences in terms of the student's self-perception and the
perception of others, including family, peers, teachers, and future employers." H.R. REP. No. 108-
77, at 98 (2003).
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pling with the difficult task of trying to improve and individualize
instruction in a time of tight educational spending generally.'
Since the initial passage of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act ("EAHCA") in 1975,5 much of the reform and innovation
taking place in special education has occurred at the federal level, result-
ing in relatively slow change made with input from a wide variety of
interest groups. The future of special education reform, however, may be
radically different. Over the last several years, an increasing number of
state legislatures have actively entered this arena, proposing or passing
laws that give children with disabilities public money to attend a private
school. Rather than trying to fix the perceived deficiencies within the
existing system, these states instead facilitate the exit of unhappy parents
and students from public schools altogether. Although the specifics of
each statute vary, most allow students with an active individualized edu-
cation plan ("IEP") who were enrolled in public school during the prior
school year to elect a voucher loosely equal to the state-funded portion
of the cost of their education.' Supporters argue that voucher programs
offer a superior approach to traditional reform because they will increase
competition among schools for children with disabilities and thereby
enhance the educational achievement of these students Additionally,
some supporters argue that this competition ultimately benefits those
students who remain in public schools as well.9
4. See, e.g., Melissa Mitchell, Money Matters. Federal Financial Support for Special
Education: What's the Right Formula?, Project ALIGN Issue Brief, March 1996, at 3 ("As a
result of the federal government's failure to fully fund special education programs and the
increases in special education identification, many states have begun to regard a reform of spe-
cial education financing as essential.").
5. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C §1400 et seq.
(2006)).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See id.
8. Rethinking Special Education: How to Reform the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Educ. Reform of the H. Comm. On Educ. and the
Workforce, 107th Cong. 107-62 (1998) (statement of Dr. Patrick J. Wolf, Assistant Professor of
Public Policy, Georgetown Public Policy Institute) ("[G]reater customer choice is likely to
enhance accountability in Special Education. Experimental customer choice programs, such as
public housing vouchers, have demonstrated that choice initiates a flight to quality.").
9. See Jay P. Greene and Marcus Winters, The Effect of Special Educ. Vouchers on Public
School Achievement: Evidence from Florida's McKay Scholarship Program, 52 MANHATrAN INST.
CIvc REPORr 20 (Apr. 2008) available at http:/www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_52.htm
(study suggesting that "public school students with relatively mild disabilities made statistically sig-
nificant test score improvements in both math and reading as more nearby private schools began
participation in the McKay program"). See also Randy Hicks, Vouchers Help Public Schools Too;
Both Student Scores and Funding Increase When There's a Little Competition, ATL. JOURNAL
CONSTrnrmON, Nov. 12, 2007, at IIA.
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The momentum toward vouchers has the potential to make a signifi-
cant and lasting impact on the manner in which children with disabilities
are educated in the United States. Because most states require students
receiving vouchers to waive their rights under the IDEA as a condition
precedent to receiving state money, this impact will be felt not only at
the state level, but also on federal policy going forward. Despite this
reality, there has been surprisingly little scholarly inquiry by the legal
academy into the impetus behind this movement, the legality of such
programs, and the corresponding public policy consequences which fol-
low their adoption. Instead, much of the literature has been driven by
interest groups, many of which arguably have pre-determined agendas
relating to school choice more generally.'" Because of the potential sig-
nificance of the voucher movement, it is critical to take a comprehensive
look at the advantages and disadvantages that vouchers pose for indi-
vidual students with disabilities and special education as a whole.
This article will explore these issues and evaluate whether voucher
programs conflict with or enhance the ideals embodied in the IDEA. Part
I examines the history and impetus behind the voucher movement, look-
ing to identify why this approach has gained such traction in a relative-
ly short period of time. Part II describes the voucher programs currently
in place in Florida, Utah, Georgia and Ohio, as well as legislation that
has been proposed around the United States, both at the state and feder-
al level. Part III evaluates the legal challenges made against the vouch-
er programs in Arizona and Florida, and the federal government's cur-
rent position on these state programs. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
diverse public policy implications of voucher programs for children with
disabilities. This section concludes that while special needs vouchers
offer an attractive option for mildly-impaired children with sufficient
resources to attend specialized schools, they offer considerably less to
the majority of children with disabilities who use vouchers to enter pri-
vate schools with no individualized instruction. The benefits secured by
the former group, moreover, are offset by the costs to those children with
10. For example, much of the information about the effectiveness of Florida's program has
come out of the Manhattan Institute, which identifies its mission as "to develop and disseminate
new ideas that foster greater economic choice and individual responsibility." http://www.man-
hattan-institute.org/. Likewise, the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, which has been
"dubbed 'the nation's leading voucher advocates" by the Wall Street Journal," has issued posi-
tive assessments of special needs vouchers. See Robert Enlow, Grading School Choice:
Evaluating School Choice Programs by the Friedman Gold Standard, SCHOOL CHOICE ISSUES IN
DEPvh 4, Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice (Feb. 2008).
July 2010]1
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disabilities who remain in a public setting. Because state and federal leg-
islatures should look to the well-being and advancement of all children
with disabilities rather than a select few in setting policy agendas,
voucher programs should be rejected or approached with extreme cau-
tion in the future.
II. ORIGINS OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS VOUCHER
MOVEMENT
There is no question that the provision of private school vouchers to
students with disabilities is highly controversial. The debate can be divi-
sive even among advocates for students with disabilities, and the tenor
of conversation here often matches that of other lightening-rod policy
debates, like abortion rights and gun control. One lobbyist in Arizona,
for example, described the debate over passage in his state as "passion-
ate" and ultimately one-sided because "[p]eople on both sides are
absolutely right about the issues. There's no middle ground, no compro-
mise. This is like war.""
Just as in many wars, there is little agreement over who should be
credited with the momentum behind the movement. Not surprisingly,
proponents of vouchers argue that it has its genesis in parental dissatis-
faction with special education programs in the public schools.'2 They
argue that the search for private options to the dilemma of difference is
necessary in light of the limited resources and administrative indiffer-
ence that children with disabilities often encounter in the public
schools." Proponents believe that vouchers will allow parents to seek
schools that are better tailored to meet the individualized needs of chil-
dren who simply do not respond to typical instructional methods.
Although the IDEA bestows procedural due process protections, it offers
little to parents who are unwilling or unable to litigate claims beyond the
11. See Andrea Falkenhagen, Vouchers for Disabled Students Go Unused, EAST VALLEY
TRmuNE, Apr. 16, 2007 (quoting Mike Smith, lobbyist with the Arizona School Administrators
Association), available at http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/story/87897.
12. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene and Greg Forster, Vouchers for Special Education Students: An
Evaluation of Florida's McKay Scholarship Program, 38 Civic REPORT 2 (June 2003),
http://www.manhattan-institute.orglhtml/cr_58.htm (describing genesis of McKay program).
13.Id.
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school level. Vouchers, advocates argue, give parents an exit strategy
more readily employed while simultaneously diminishing the public
resources spent on litigation over the scope of services provided. 4
The debate over passage of voucher bills in many states supports this
parent-driven scenario to at least some extent. In many states, just as at
the federal level,"5 the individual introducing the voucher legislation has
ties to an individual with disabilities. For example, then-Senator John
McKay, for whom Florida's McKay scholarship is named, is the parent
of a child with disabilities.6 Typically, moreover, there are a number of
parents in each state who voice their support of voucher legislation in
local newspapers and hearings before state legislatures. ' This support
often involves stories of children with disabilities failing in public
schools with no recourse in sight.'8
Beyond this support, however, there is no question that a number of
interest groups and individual legislators have stepped on the bandwagon
of special needs vouchers as the pathway to meeting other legislative
agendas. The most common of these is a desire for universal school
choice. For these advocacy organizations, children with disabilities may
be elected as the poster children for the voucher movement because it is
difficult politically to argue against benefits that will serve this vulnerable
14. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene, The Uses of Vouchers, CITY JOURNAL, July 28, 2009,
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/nytom-school-choice.html (arguing that most parents do not
have the resources "to engage in ongoing legal battles" to enforce their children's rights, and that
vouchers provide a "mechanism- a market mechanism- to help make their rights a reality");
Marcus A. Winters, Offer Vouchers for Special Education, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Dec. 28, 2008,
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/miarticle.htmid=3768 ("With a special education
voucher, disgruntled parents can skip the courtroom drama and send their child directly to a pri-
vate school").
15. See, e.g., JACQUEUNE VAUGHN SWITZER, DIsABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DIsABIITY
PoucY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 103 (discussing the significant relationships of sponsors of
the ADA with people with disabilities).
16. See Greene and Forster, supra note 12, at 1. In Ohio, the Autism Scholarship Pilot
Program was introduced by Representative Jon Peterson, who has a daughter with autism. See
Liz Olivier, States Debate School Choice for Students with Autism, AUrISM SPECrRUM
QUARrERLY 12 (Summer 2007).
17. See, e.g., Amy K. Stewart, Bill Would Educate Parents About Carson Smith Scholarship,
DEsERT NEws, Feb. 27, 2009, at A4 ("Dozens of parents of special needs children rallied at the
Capitol Friday to tell their story to lawmakers and show support for the Carson Smith Scholarship
program.").
18. Deidre Fernandes, Plan Opens Door to Vouchers, Public School Advocates Say, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, March 2, 2006, at Al (quoting Percilla Zeno, whose seventeen year-old spe-
cial-needs son had been bullied in public school, as "really ecstatic" to see a Virginia special edu-
cation voucher plan reintroduced in the House).
July 2010]
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group. 9 The debate surrounding passage of these bills tends to be charac-
terized as pro-disability or anti-disability, with obvious consequences for
opponents of school choice. In Missouri, for example, national school
choice organizations financed YouTube videos of autistic children to facil-
itate support for pending special-needs scholarship legislation in early
2008.0 The debate surrounding passage of the voucher bill was then
framed to make thoughtful debate a virtual impossibility-"[e]ither you're
for autistic kids or you're against autistic kids. '2' This stark positioning
proved uncomfortable even for some supporters of school choice. As one
legislator commented, "They have picked a group of individuals to try to
advance their agenda, and I'm bothered by that... I just feel very strong-
ly we shouldn't be using this group of people. 22
These legislative initiatives to some extent are driven by the "acorn
theory" of school choice. Children with disabilities are chosen to lead
the voucher charge both because of the sympathetic face they place on
the debate and the nearly universal view that public education has failed
this group at some level .23 By cracking the door open and gaining public
acceptance for some funding of private school, special needs vouchers
serve as the seed or "acorn" that will grow into universal school choice
for all students in the state. It is noteworthy that in some states that have
19. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, The Politics of Special Ed Vouchers:
What You Can Expect from the Presidential Candidates, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 01,2008,
at A15 (arguing that special education voucher programs are more politically appealing and
rarely face legal challenges because "teachers' unions don't relish the image of dragging disabled
kids into courts to compel them to return to public schools that were serving them poorly");
Andrew Rotherman, McKay Madness! A Veil of Ignorance? Or a Tail of Willful Ignorance
Wagging the Voucher Dog in Florida, eduwonk.com (May 26, 2006) ("Of course, in the end
Mckay is really not about special education anyway. It's about vouchers. And it's a good sell.
That's why the program is wildly popular among voucher advocates, it reduces people like me to
appearing to be picking on disabled kids.").
20. See, e.g.,Virginia Young, Bill Would Give Aid for Tuition to Autistic Children, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 11,2008, at B 1. The videos were financed by Children's Education Council
of Missouri.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Rep. Shannon Cooper, R-Clinton). In part as a response to the allegation that
opponents of the bill were anti-autism, legislation was introduced in the House which would fund
an autism-training program for teachers, develop a set of best practices for children with autism,
and establish an Autism Spectrum Disorder Commission responsible for developing a strategic
plan to address the growing number of autistic children in the state. See H.B. 2304, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
23. One lobbyist has argued that lawmakers "decided in a bizarre way that the best way to
get vouchers is by target populations. The belief is, if they get enough of these then there's criti-
cal mass - then they can open the voucher program to everybody." See Andrea Falkenhagen,
Vouchers for Disabled Students Go Unused, EAST VALLEY TRmuNE, Apr. 16,2007 (quoting Mike
Smith, lobbyist with the Arizona School Administrators Association).
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passed special needs voucher legislation, bills for universal school
choice followed within a short period of the original bill's passage.'
Organizations and individuals interested in religious education have
also played a prominent role in the voucher movement. In Florida, which
established the first special needs voucher program, critics argued that
Governor Jeb Bush and GOP legislators were primarily interested "not
in vouchers for disabled students but in vouchers students can use at reli-
gious schools." 25 As evidence for this assertion, critics pointed to the
absence of oversight in Florida's original voucher legislation and the
"laughable" accountability provisions added in 2006, which require no
standardized testing or teacher credentialing, and provide no way to
assess the quality of participating schools.26 Whether or not this is cor-
rect, it is notable that religious schools have entered the market for
voucher students in Florida much more rapidly than secular schools and
educate a majority of students receiving vouchers in Florida.
Not surprisingly, some attribute the voucher movement to private
school operators with a financial interest in expanding student popula-
tions. In Florida, critics have argued that the voucher program was influ-
enced to a significant extent by individuals in this group.28 As an exam-
ple of this, they point out that the program was changed in 2005 to delete
the statutory provision requiring participating schools to accept vouch-
ers as full payment of tuition. This change, which conceivably could
exclude many low-income children from participating in the program,
was apparently brought about in part as a result of the influence of a pri-
24. Georgia, for example, has progressively moved towards a universal school voucher. The
Special Needs Scholarship Act was enacted on April 20, 2007, and was soon followed by the pas-
sage of Georgia H.B. 1133, which created a school choice tax credit program for Georgians (cod-
ified at GA. CODE. ANN. 20-2A-1). Georgia unsuccessfully introduced legislation in 2008 to allow
students at public schools which fail or lose accreditation to attend an alternate public school or
receive a private school voucher (S.B. 458) and to provide universal school vouchers (S.B. 90).
25. Correct Voucher Policy? Stick to McKay Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST, May 13, 2006, at
14A.
26. d.
27. See Florida Dep't. of Educ., John M. McKay Scholarship Program Quarterly Report
(June 2009), [hereinafter McKay Quarterly Report 2009], http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/
InformationlMcKay/quarterlyreports/mckay-reportjune2OO9.pdf.
28. See, e.g., S.V. Date, Private-School Director Influences Education Policy, PALM BEACH
POST 4A (April 12, 2004) (detailing influence of Patricia Hardman, head of Dyslexia Research
Institute, a school that would receive and benefit from McKay scholarships, in limiting account-
ability provisions in statute).
July 2010]
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vate school head with significant political connections who was appoint-
ed to a Florida Senate task force to study the voucher program.9
Predictably, standing on the opposite side of this issue are teachers' unions
and opponents of universal school choice. In general, these organizations are
opposed to any measure that would "provide public tax dollars to parents in
order to attend private schools."'3 Teacher organizations both have argued
against passage of voucher legislation in their states and have successfully
filed litigation to overturn such legislation upon its enactment.'
Although disability advocacy groups are clearly interested in the pro-
vision of special needs vouchers, there is split as to whether they believe
such programs provide a step forward for children with disabilities or are
a dangerous renunciation of the public's obligation to provide a free
appropriate public education ("FAPE") for all students. 2 Some are wary
of taking a position that is contrary to that adopted by some parents in
their organizations, and thus have elected to take no official stand on
voucher legislation.33 As vouchers gain traction within state legislatures,
however, an increasing number of disability advocacy and interest groups
have issued formal statements both for and against their adoption. 4 To
date, no clear consensus has emerged among these organizations.
29. See, e.g., S.V. Date, Tuition Might Rise for Parents Using Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST
IA (May 16, 2004). Patricia Hardman also "opposed any increased oversight... [and] proposed
requirements that schools be accredited and use certified teachers." Id. See also Vouchers Become
Subsidy for State's Private Schools, BEACH POST 10A (May 22, 2004) (editorial concluding that
"Florida's voucher programs have crossed the line at which the pretense of helping students ends
and the real goal of enriching private schools becomes clear.").
30. OEA Testifies Against Special Education Vouchers, OEA LEGISLATWE WATCH (Nov. 2,
2007). See also Corrina Jennings, Texas Considers Special-Needs Vouchers, SCHOoL REFORM
NEws 4 (June 2009).
31. See infra at Part liA.
32. See, e.g., Katherine Shek, Educators, Advocates Fight to Keep Vouchers Out of IDEA,
specialedconnection.com (April 23, 2003). In Texas, for example, the group Texas Parents for
Autism Scholarships favors voucher legislation, while Advocacy, Inc., a disability rights organi-
zation, opposes it. Public Policy Issues Update: "Voucher" Proposals for Students with
Disabilities During the 81st Texas Legislature (2009), http://www.txddc.state.tx.us/about-
us/council/meetings/febO9mtgs/v-tabl4-feb-09.pdf. See also Olivier, supra note 16, at 14.
33. See, e.g., Autism Society of Ohio, Ohio's Autism Scholarship Program (noting that the
organization is "currently neutral" on the Autism Scholarship Program in Ohio and takes "no stand"),
http://www.autismohio.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=520&Itemid= 134.
34. See, e.g., National Council on Disability, School Vouchers and Students with
Disabilities, http:llwww.ncd.govlnewsroomlpublicationsl2003/vouchers.htm; The Disability
Policy Consortium, Oppose School Vouchers, http:/lwww.dpctexas.org/Documents/
Texas_81st_LegislativeIssues/ib20.php; Council for Exceptional Children, Position on School
Vouchers and IDEA Authorization (2003), available at http://www.cec.sped.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/PolicyAdvocacy/CECPolicyResources/voucherstatement2003 .pdf; President's
Commission on Excellence in Special Education, A NEw ERA: REVITAuZING SPECIAL EDUCATION
FOR CHILDREN AND THmin FAMIUIS 35 (July 2002) (advocating for increased school choice).
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF SPECIAL NEEDS
VOUCHER PROGRAMS
As of the writing of this article, three states provide universal vouch-
ers for all students with disabilities, while a fourth limits its voucher pro-
gram to children with autism. As reflected by the number of states who
have proposed similar legislation, there is little doubt that this number
will grow in the near future.35 This section explores the key components
of the existing state programs and identifies proposed legislation in other
states. It concludes with a brief discussion of federal efforts to incorpo-
rate this option into the most recent reauthorization of the IDEA and its
resurrection during the 2008 Presidential election.
A. Universal Special Needs Vouchers
1. Florida: The McKay Scholarship Program for Students with
Disabilities
Florida's John M. McKay Scholarship for Students with Disabilities,
first offered in 2000, provides scholarships to enable children with dis-
abilities to attend either a public school outside of their home school or a
private school of their choice.36 Eligible students must be enrolled in pub-
lic school for at least one year and have both a qualifying disability and an
individualized education plan ("IEP") in place?7 Scholarships are equal to
the private school's tuition and fees or the amount the student's home dis-
35. See infra Part II.C. As this article was nearing publication, the state of Oklahoma was
close to passing special needs scholarship legislation. See H.B. 3393,52nd Leg. Sess. (Ok. 2010).
See also Tim Talley, Okla. Bill Would Create Special Needs Scholarship, R&D (May 5, 2010)
(discussing likely passage of special needs scholarship in Oklahoma), available at
http://www.rdmag.com/News/FeedsAP/20 10/05/life-sciences-okla-bill-would-create-special-
needs-scholarships/.
36. FiA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(1) (West 2007); Florida Dep't. of Educ., John M. McKay
Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, [hereinafter McKay Scholarships] available
at http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/lnformation/McKay/files/Fast-Facts-McKay.pdf.
37. FLA. STAr. ANN. § 1002.39(1)-(2) (West 2007). As this article was nearing publication,
Florida passed a bill that would expand eligibility for McKay scholarships to include children
entering kindergarten and children who have been enrolled in public schools "in any of the 5
years prior to the 2010-2011 fiscal year," even if they are not currently so enrolled. See C.S JH.B.
1505, §§ 2(a), 3, 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/
Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=_h 1505er.docx& DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=
1505&Session=2010. The bill passed both the Florida House and Senate in late April 2010 but
had not been signed by the governor at the time of writing this article. The amendments, if signed,
will take effect in July 2010.
July 2010]
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trict would have received for the student from the state, whichever is less38
In the 2007-2008, awards ranged between $5,160 and $21,769, with an
average award of $7,295. 39 That same year, the state paid out more than
$131 million to students participating in the program.' Once given, a
scholarship remains in place until a student returns to public school, grad-
uates or turns twenty-two, whichever occurs first.4' The McKay program
grew significantly in its first seven years of operation, expanding from 970
participating students in 2000 to 20,530 in 2009.42
In order to participate in the program, schools must register with and
be approved by the state Department of Education ("DOE").43 In 2009,
nearly 900 schools were identified as eligible to receive scholarship stu-
dents." In the early years of the legislation, few requirements were
placed on schools receiving vouchers, and a number of fraudulent
schools were found to be operating within the program.45 To address this
problem, the Florida legislature added several statutory safeguards in
2006. Schools are now required to maintain a physical site where stu-
dents regularly attend classes.47 In addition, they must demonstrate fiscal
soundness, satisfy health and safety codes, and have in place a non-dis-
crimination policy." The teaching staff at each school also must hold at
least a baccalaureate degree, have three years of teaching experience in
public or private schools, or "have special skills, knowledge, or expert-
ise" to be deemed sufficiently qualified. 9 Moreover, all personnel with
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(10)(a)-(b).
39. See McKay Scholarships, supra note 36.
40.Id.
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(4)(a). Parents may request a reassessment of the award total
every three years. Id. § 1002.39(5)(c).
42. McKay Scholarships, supra note 36, at 1.
43. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(6)(b).
44. McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 5.
45. See, e.g., S.V. Date, Lack of Voucher Accountability Comes Back to Sting Proponent,
PALM BEAcm POST, June 30, 2004, at 13A (discussing incidents of fraud in Florida voucher pro-
gram).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(8)(c)-(d). The Florida legislature has proposed additional
safeguards in recent legislation which passed both the House and Senate in April 2010 but had
not been signed by the governor at the time of this article. The legislation, once signed, would
permit the Commissioner of Education to "deny, suspend or revoke a private school's participa-
tion in the scholarship program" if there is evidence that the school is "operating or has operat-
ed ... in a manner contrary to the health, safety or welfare of the public." C.SJH.B. 1505, §§
7(a)2, 2010 Leg. (Fla. 2010).
47. Id. This provision was added in part as a result of on-line correspondence schools receiv-
ing voucher money. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.39(8)(d).
48. Id. § 1002.421(2).
49. Id. § 1002.421(2)(h).
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"direct student contact" must undergo criminal background checks and
fmgerprinting.5° To ensure that information reported by participating
schools is accurate, the DOE is authorized to conduct random site visits
to participating schools to verify all submitted information.'
The legislature in 2006 also enhanced the substantive accountability
measures of the statute to help parents monitor the progress of partici-
pating students. Schools are required to provide parents with a written
report explaining their child's progress during the academic year on at
least an annual basis. 2 Schools are likewise required to facilitate student
participation in statewide annual assessments when parents indicate a
desire for testing. 3 Significantly, however, schools are not required to
administer any standardized tests themselves, despite the fact that
Florida's other voucher programs require such testing.'
2. Utah: Carson Smith Scholarship for Students with Special Needs55
The Carson Smith Scholarship program was first implemented during
the 2005-2006 school year and is available to a wide range of students
with disabilities. The program served 482 students during the 2007-2008
school year and was predicted to grow by as much as 49% by the end of
that term.56 Like Florida, Utah permits resident students who have an IEP
and were enrolled in public school during the prior school year to apply
for a scholarship to attend a private school.57 The state diverges from the
McKay program, however, in two ways: (1) new scholarship recipients
50. Id. § 1002.421(2)(i).
51. Id. § 1002.39(6)(f).
52. Id. § 1002.39(8)(c)-(d).
53. Id. § 1002.39(5)(f).
54. Private schools accepting students through the Florida's Corporate Tax Credit vouchers,
which offers vouchers to underprivileged children, must annually administer a nationally norm-
referenced test identified by the Florida DOE and report the scores both to parents and an inde-
pendent research organization. FL. STAT. ANN. § 220.187(8)(c)(2). The testing reports, however,
will only be reported in the aggregate rather than by school, making it impossible to determine
progress at the individual level. Id. § 220.187(9)0).
55. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-701et seq. (2007).
56. Lisa Schenker, Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship Program Growing in Utah,
SALT LAKE TRIuNE, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http:/lwww.sltrib.com/education/ci_8078447.
The number of recipients grew 234% in 2006-07, and 34% in the 2007-2008 school year as of
January 2008. Report to the Utah Legislature, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE CARSON SMrrH
SCHOLARSHIP FOR STUDENrS wrr SPECIAL NEEDS 5 (January 2008). Notably, the 2008 state audit
report concluded that "[tihe number of additional students receiving the scholarship appears to
be slowing down." Id.
57. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-704(2)(d).
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are selected by lottery when the number of applicants exceeds the fund-
ing allocated by the state; and (2) students enrolled in private schools
that have "previously served students with disabilities" are permitted to
apply for scholarships when an "assessment team"58 can "readily deter-
mine with reasonable certainty that the student has a disability ... and
would qualify for special education services."'59 A considerable number
of children establish eligibility via the latter method, with one recent
audit finding that 62% of children across five districts "were not in pub-
lic school at the time they applied for and received the Carson Smith
Scholarship."6"
During the 2009-2010 school year, forty-eight private schools partic-
ipated in the program, a growth of 500% since 2005 .61 The state's list of
requirements for participating private schools is similar in many respects
to that of Florida. Schools must operate in a physical location that pro-
vides direct contact between students and teachers, complete an audit
that confirms the fiscal soundness of the school, have a non-discrimina-
tion policy in place, and comply with health and safety codes.62 Teacher
requirements are largely identical, 3 as is the substantive requirement
that schools formally assess students' academic progress each year, with
a report provided both to the parent and to the assessment team.' Unlike
Florida, Utah requires participating schools to disclose to parents the
special education services that will be provided to their child, the cost of
58. Members of the assessment team include parents, the student's private school teacher,
special education personnel from the student's school district, and special education personnel
from the private school where the student is enrolled. Id. § 53A-la-703(1)(a)-(d).
59. Id. § 53A-la-704(3)(b)(i). The statute defines disability consistently with the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. See id. § 53A-la-704(2)(b)(i)-(xi). See also Parents for Choice in
Education, The Carson Smith Special Needs Scholarship (indicating that "[n]ew applications are
being accepted on a lottery"), available at http://www.choiceineducation.org/
index.php?option=com content&view=category&layout=blog&id=139&Itemid=185.
60. Report to Utah State Legislature, supra note 56, at 7.
61. Parents for Choice in Education, Special Needs Voucher Program Grows Beyond
Expectations, June 4, 2008, available at http://www.choiceineducation.org/documentsl
PressRelease_2008 06 05.pdf; Carson Smith Scholarship 2009-2010 Eligible School List, avail-
able at http://schools.utah.gov/additionalinformation/Carson-Smith-Scholarship.aspx.
62. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-705(1).
63. At a minimum, teachers are required to have a baccalaureate degree, three years of teach-
ing experience, or "the necessary skills, knowledge, or expertise that qualifies them to provide
instruction" in particular subjects to special needs students. Id. § 53A-la-705(1)(g). They also
must pass a criminal background check. See Utah Office of Educ., Special Needs Scholarship
Program Description, available at http://www.schools.utah.gov/admin/documents/2008-
09_ProgramDescription.pdf.
64. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-705(1)(f).
[Vol. 39, No. 3
Vouchers for Students with Disabilities 303
such services, and the credentials of the teaching staff to facilitate place-
ment decisions.65
Scholarship amounts are calculated according to either the level of
special education assistance the student would receive in public school
or the private school's tuition and fees, whichever is less.' Students who
fall in the former category are awarded either a "partial" scholarship if
they receive less than 180 minutes of special education per day, or a
"full" scholarship if they receive more than 180 minutes7 During the
2010-2011 school year, Utah will award partial scholarship recipients
$3,865.50, and full scholarship recipients $6,442.50.1 The program is
funded annually by the Utah legislature, and scholarships are limited by
the availability of such funds. In 2007-2008, a report to the Utah
Legislature estimated that $2.5 million annually will be required to fund
the program at its current level, which notably does not account for
growth in the program. 9
Scholarships remain in effect for a three year period. 0 In order to secure
an additional three year extension, students must be evaluated by the
assessment team to determine whether the student still qualifies for spe-
cial education services and, if so, at what funding level.7 The scholarship
ultimately terminates when a student graduates or turns twenty-two.72
3. Georgia: Special Needs Scholarship Act"
Georgia is the most recent state to offer vouchers to students with dis-
abilities. Beginning in the 2007-2008 school year, students enrolled in
public school in Georgia for at least one year with a categorical disabil-
ity and an IEP are eligible to participate in the program. 4 Upon accept-
ance, a student may either transfer to a different public school or use
65. Id. § 53A-la-705(l)(e).
66. Id. § 53A-la-706(2).
67. Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at 12.
68. See Utah Office of Educ., Special Needs Scholarship (2010-2011) Program Overview
for Parent Applicants, available at http:/lschools.utah.gov/additionalinformationlDOCS/2010-
1 lParentProgram Overview.aspx.
69. Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at i, 11. Under Utah law, vouchers may
be awarded by lottery if expenditures grows beyond desired or expected levels. Id. at 17.
70. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-704(6)(a).
71. Id. § 53A-la-704(6)(b)-(d).
72. Id. § 53A-la-704(6)(d).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2111 et seq. (2007).
74. Id. § 20-2-2114(a).
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state money to attend a private school approved by the state DOE."
Scholarships are awarded in amounts equal to the state-funded portion
of a student's public education or a private school's tuition, whichever is
less.76 In 2008-2009, students received an average award of $6,331 .
Parents are responsible for the remaining tuition, if any, charged by the
private school. In 2008-2009, 1,596 students received a tuition grant to
attend one of 145 private schools.78
The requirements for private schools are very similar to those employed
in Florida and Utah as described above. In addition, participating schools
must be accredited or provisionally accredited at one of twelve accredit-
ing agencies identified by the Department of Education.' Teachers are
required to have a bachelor's degree or at least three years of experience
in education and health.80 Schools are required to "regularly report" to both
parents and the DOE on a student's academic progress, but no substantive
standards are provided. Parents are, however, given the right to request
that their child participate in any state-wide assessments .8
Scholarships remain in place indefinitely until a student graduates
from high school or turns twenty-one, whichever occurs first. 2 The
statute provides that acceptance of a scholarship constitutes a parental
refusal to consent to services under the IDEA.'
B. Restricted Special Needs Vouchers - The Ohio Autism
Scholarship Program84
Unlike other states with special needs voucher programs, Ohio has
authorized scholarships only for children with autism and autism-spectrum
disorders. To be eligible, a child must be identified as autistic by the school
75. Id. § 20-2-2113(b)(1)-(4).
76. Id. § 20-2-2116(a)-(b).
77. See Georgia Dept. of Education, 2008-2009 SPEciAL NEEDs ScuoLARsmP PROGRAM
(GSNS) PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT 2 (Nov. 18, 2008); Bridget Gutierrez, Vouchers Popular,
Limited, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTrnvON, December 17, 2007, at A1.
78. See Georgia Department of Education, supra note 77, at 2; Gutierrez, supra note 77, at A1.
79. Georgia Department of Education, GEORGL SPEcIAL NEEDs SCHoLARsHIP PROGRAM
PRIVATE SCHOOL RESPONSIBILMES 2, http://public.doe.kl2.ga.us/DMGetDocument.aspx/
010808 %20Georgia%20GSNS %20Private%2OSchool%20Responsibilities%
20to%20post.pdfp=6CC6799F8C1371F68ECD 17D75DC08CF5932DC8247A27C58E7299C9
7D23FFFA52&Type=D.
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2115(a)(7).
81. Id. § 20-2-2114(c).
82. Id. § 20-2-2114(e).
83. Id. § 20-2-2114(f).
84. Oiuo REV. CODE ANN. § 3310.41 (West 2008).
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district, have an IEP in place, and either be enrolled in a public school or
eligible to enroll the year the scholarship is sought.' Once these conditions
are met, the child is entitled to receive up to $20,000 "to pay tuition... to
attend a special education program that implements the child's individual-
ized education program."' Private service providers may qualify under this
definition. In the first quarter of the 2004-2005 school year, 178 children
actively participated in the program. 7 By the 2007-2008 school year, this
number had increased to over 900 students." There is no cap in the statute
limiting the number of students who can participate.
Ohio'sscholarship program is unique in several ways. It requires par-
ticipating service providers to implement the child's IEP as developed
by the school district, therefore controlling at least to some extent the
content of the child's education. The statute does not require parents to
explicitly waive all rights under the IDEA in order to receive services.
Although public schools are relieved from providing a free appropriate
public education to children who receive the scholarship, they neverthe-
less are required to "initiat[e] and conduct.., meetings for the purpose
of developing, reviewing, and revising the IEP of a child with a disabil-
ity on at least an annual basis."89 There is no ongoing assurance of pay-
ment, and parents must apply for reimbursement each year.'
Private schools and individual service providers must be authorized
by the DOE to participate in the program. Applicants must provide the
credentials of each employee and an affidavit affirming compliance with
all state requirements, including the existence of a nondiscrimination
policy, fiscal soundness, and operation for at least one year prior to
application.9 Once approved, providers must give progress reports both
85. Id. § 3310.41(A)(7).
86. Id. § 3310.41(B). To secure these funds, participating parents submit evidence of fees
incurred and receive reimbursement from the state. There is no cash outlay as in other state pro-
grams. See Ohio Dept. of Educ., AutnsM SCHoLARsHn' PRoGRAM GuIDELINES (2009-2010) § 4,
available at http:/leducation.ohio.gov/GDTemplateslPages/ODE/ODEDetail.aspx?page=3&
TopicRelationlD=459&ContentlD=6678.
87. See Ohio Legislative Office of Educ. Oversight, Formative Evaluation of Ohio's Autism
Scholarship (May 22, 2005).
88. See Autism Society of Ohio, Ohio's Autism Scholarship Program, available at
http://www.autismohio.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=520&Itemid= 134#
Statistics. At least one report provided a slightly lower number of children served-approxi-
mately 734 families in 2007. Piet Van Lier, ANALYZING AuTISM VOucHERS IN Oio: A REPORT
FROM PouLcY MATrERs OHio 1 (Mar. 2008).
89. See Ohio Dept. of Educ., supra note 86, at § 6(5).
90. See id. at § 1(2).
91. See id. at App. B.
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to the child's parents and the child's school district on a "regular basis"
which outline the child's progress in obtaining his or her IEP goals.
In late 2007, the Ohio legislature introduced bills to create a Special
Education Pilot Program which would extend a similar scholarship to all
children with disabilities in the state with an active IEP. The legislature
had attempted to pass this same program as part of budget legislation in
early 2007, but the governor vetoed the relevant provisions.93 Eight edu-
cation stakeholder groups testified in opposition to the proposed pro-
gram.' The bill was reintroduced in 2008 but lacked one vote in the
House to become law. The bill was introduced for a third time in 2009
but remained in Committee at the end of the year.95
C. Proposed Special Needs Voucher Legislation
Several states have introduced special needs scholarship legislation in
the last few years, including Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Nevada,
Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. 96 Many of the provisions track the
statutes in place in Florida, Georgia and Utah generally. Although most
cover all students with disabilities, several of the bills relate exclusively
92. See Ohio H.B. 348 at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/
127ga/HB0348IN.htm) and H.B. 431 http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/126ga/
HBO431HR.htm- HB431.
93. See Christina A. Samuels, Ohio Special Education Voucher Program Defeated,
EDUCATION WEEK (Dec. 11,2008), available at http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/vouchers/.
94. These organizations include the Ohio Education Association, the Ohio School Boards
Association, the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, the Ohio Association of Public
School Employees, the Ohio Association of School Business Officials, the Ohio Federation of
Teachers, the Ohio Parent Teacher Association, the Ohio School Psychologists Association and
the League of Women Voters. See OEA Testifies Against Special Education Vouchers, OEA
LEGIsLATIVE WATCH (November 2, 2007), available at http://bucyrusea.ohea.us/
important%20documents/Legislative%20Watches/LegislativeWatch.pdf.
95. See http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/senl28.nsf/e16bcd54ff380ee5852560f20055a7fO/
e7fd076ef10aa 4de85257560006138 lf?OpenDocument.
96. See, e.g., H.B. 227, 2008 Leg. (Ala. 2008); S.B. 08-142, 66th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2008) (defeated in committee); CO S.B. 130 (2009); H.B. 397, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2008); KY S.B. 186 (2009); S.B. 813, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008); H.B. 1886, 94th Gen. Ass.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S.B. 993, 94th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S.B. 08-2026,
2008 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); MS SB 2117 (2009); H.B. 3393,52nd Leg. (Ok. 2010); H.B. 3101,
117th Sess. (S.C. 2007-2008); 86th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. H.B. 2482 (Ark. 2007); S.B. 282,2007
Leg. (Kan. 2007); S.B. 158, 2007 Leg. (Nev. 2007); NV S.B. 81 (2009); A.B. 130, 2007 Leg.
(Nev. 2007); H.B. 3349, 74th Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.B. 19, 80th Leg. Sess. (Tex.
2007); TX H.B. 716, S.B. 183 (Tex. 2009); S.B. 2204 (Tex. 2009).
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to children with autism.9 A few states, moreover, have proposed provi-
sions that are not reflected in existing legislation. One of the bills intro-
duced in Missouri would establish a special needs scholarship through a
corporate tax credit program, which seems to be a hybrid of Florida's
McKay scholarship and Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship Program for
low-income children. 98 Several states have proposed heightened
accountability requirements for participating private schools. Texas, for
example, would require private schools accepting vouchers to adminis-
ter standardized tests and report individual results to parents and aggre-
gate results to the public.99 The proposed Oregon and Alabama bills
would impose heightened teacher qualification standards, requiring
teachers who provide special education or related services to children
receiving autism scholarships to be certified and licensed pursuant to
state standards.1°° To facilitate their non-discrimination requirements,
Texas and Nevada also propose requiring participating schools to hold a
lottery for available positions when they have more qualified applicants
than positions available.10' Finally, several of the proposed bills would
require school districts to transport children participating in the scholar-
ships to the private school of their choice."°
All of the bills raised prior to 2008 stalled before a formal vote was
taken by the full state legislature. Some legislation remains pending as
of the writing of this article.0 3 The level of legislative activity relating to
special needs vouchers suggests a high degree of interest in these pro-
97. See H.B. 227,2008 Leg. (Ala. 2008); A.B. 130,2007 Leg. (Nev. 2007); H.B. 3349,74th
Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). Notably, however, these bills are closer to the McKay scholar-
ship than the Ohio autism program in terms of scope and substantive content. The Oregon legis-
lation, for example, notes that "the participating school is not required to abide by the [scholar-
ship student's public] individualized education program," unlike the Ohio statute which simply
provides funds to private providers implementing public IEPs. H.B. 3349(2)(5).
98. H.B. 1886, 94th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.187
(2008) (CTC program).
99. H.B. 19, 80th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (proposed § 29.357(1)-(2)). Colorado similarly
would require all participating students to take state-wide assessment tests but includes no pro-
vision to report results publicly by school. S.B. 08-142, 66th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2008) (proposed § 22-20-206((3)).
100. H.B. 2257,2008 Leg. (Ala. 2008) (proposed §6(b)(3)); H.B.3349,74th Leg. Ass., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2007) (proposed § 6(4)).
101. H.B. 19, 80th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (proposed § 29.355(2)(b)); S.B. 158, 2007 Leg.
(Nev. 2007) (proposed § 14(1)); A.B. 130,2007 Leg. (Nev. 2007) (proposed § 14(1)).
102. See, e.g., H. 3101, 116th Sess. (S.C. 2007-2008) (proposed §59-156-40(c); ); H.B. 397,
2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008) (proposed § 4(4)).
103. See, e.g., H.B. 3393, 52nd Leg. Sess. (Ok. 2010).
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grams, and it is likely to remain "among the fastest-growing choice poli-
cies" across the nation.14
D. Federal Consideration of Vouchers
The potential for a special needs voucher program at the federal level
was considered in 2003 during the IDEA reauthorization debates.
Representative Jim DeMint, a Republican from South Carolina, intro-
duced an amendment that would have allowed states to supplement
existing special needs voucher programs with IDEA Part B funds "if the
Federal funds are distributed to parents who make a genuine independ-
ent choice as to the appropriate school for their child ... ."0 The amend-
ment provided that "a private school accepting those funds shall be
deemed, for both the programs and services delivered to the child, to be
providing a free appropriate public education and to be in compliance
with section 504," 1 simultaneously fulfilling the state's obligation to
provide FAPE.' 7 It also allowed for the provision of federal grants to
states to plan, design, and implement voucher programs similar to
Florida's McKay scholarship. 8 Although the amendment required pri-
vate schools receiving federal voucher money "to be academically
accountable to the parent for meeting the educational needs of the stu-
dent," it imposed no substantive provisions or accountability meas-
ures. 109
Predictably, the National School Board Association and the National
Coalition for Public Education were opposed to the federal subsidization
of special needs vouchers. 10 A number of disability-rights organizations,
including the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, the
National Coalition on Self-Determination, and the National Council on
Independent Living, also voiced their opposition to the amendment."'
Ultimately, their position carried the day. Although the amendment
104. Greene and Winters, supra note 9, at *2.
105. 149 CONG. REc. H3514 (amending § 612(a)(10)(A)(vii)(I)).
106. Id. (amending § 612(a)(10)(A)(vii)(II)).
107. Id. (amending § 612(a)(10)(A)(vii)(II)).
108. Id. (amending § 664(c)).
109. Id. (amending § 612(c)(11)(D)).
110. See Anne Checkosky, Voucher Advocates Claim IDEA's Procedure Undermines
Relationships, specialedconnection.com (March 5, 2003); Katherine Shek, Educators, Advocates
Fight to Keep Vouchers Out of IDEA, specialedconnection.com (April 23, 2003).
111. Id. See also Kara Urbanski, Schools to Lose Funding, Staff if Vouchers Go Nationwide,
specialedconnection.com (Mar. 6, 2003).
[Vol. 39, No. 3
Vouchers for Students with Disabilities 309
passed in the Education Reform Subcommittee of the House Education
and Workforce Committee, it was defeated on the House floor by a vote
182 to 240.112
Representative Marilyn Musgrave, a Republican from Colorado,
offered an amendment authorizing states to provide vouchers to students
with disabilities already attending private schools. The IDEA requires
school districts to set aside a portion of IDEA Part-B dollars to provide
special education and related services to private school students with
disabilities in an amount proportionate to the number of children with
disabilities enrolled in private schools in the district."3 The amendment
would have allowed districts to award a "certificate" directly to parents
in an amount equal to the per-pupil amount of the proportionate set-aside
funds, or the actual cost of special education and related services for the
special needs private student, whichever is less."4 The voucher could
then "be redeemed by the parents at eligible special education and relat-
ed services providers" identified by the Local Education Agency
("LEA"), which must meet minimal fiscal and legal requirements simi-
lar to those is in the McKay scholarship."5 This amendment proved to be
even less popular than the broader voucher proposal by Representative
DeMint, however, and was defeated on the House floor 176 to 247.6
The potential for a federal voucher program for students with disabil-
ities was most recently considered during the 2008 Presidential cam-
paign. Sarah Palin, the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee and moth-
er of a child with Down's syndrome, advocated changing federal regu-
lations to facilitate and encourage states to adopt a special needs schol-
arship similar to the McKay model. "7 In states adopting such programs,
112. 149 CONG. REC. H3523 (2003).
113. This is particularly true for those districts which include private schools catering to stu-
dents with disabilities. Federal education money is allocated according to the total number of
public and private school students within a district, rather than the total number of students with
disabilities within the district. The IDEA, moreover, requires schools to allocate federal funding
based on the total number of students attending private schools within the district. Mark C.
Weber, Services for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity,
36 J.L. & EDUC. 163, 174 (2007). As a result, districts with private schools serving students with
disabilities "will have to share" their federal dollars with a disproportionately large number of
private school students. Id. at 175.
114. 149 CONG. REc. H3517 (2003) (amending § 612(a)(10)(A)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3524.
117. See Katherine Zernike, Palin Promises Choice for Disabled Students, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2008, at A13.
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IDEA funding would follow the child and be fully portable to any pub-
lic or private school elected by the parents."8 Although Governor Palin
promised that "the McCain-Palin team will . . . expect states to hold
these [private] schools accountable," she provided no details as to how
or at what level this oversight would occur.' 9
As fate would have it, Barack Obama won the Presidential race in late
2008. Although he at one time indicated that he would support private
school vouchers if empirical evidence supported their effectiveness, he
voiced his apparently unilateral opposition to "using public money for
private school[s]" during the latter part of his campaign.' As a result,
there is unlikely to be a significant push to fund special needs vouchers
at the federal level in the near future.
IV. THE LEGALITY OF SPECIAL NEEDS VOUCHERS
Given the level of controversy surrounding voucher programs, it is no
surprise that opponents of special needs vouchers have challenged their
legitimacy in court. The following section discusses these legal chal-
lenges and explores the U.S. Office of Civil Right's position on how such
programs interface with the requirements of federal civil rights statutes.
A. State Challenges to Special Needs Vouchers
Because education is one of the foundational obligations of each state,
state law provides the most immediate check on any legislature's ability
to implement a voucher program. Court treatment of a voucher program
in Florida similar to the McKay scholarship, as well a direct challenge
to a program in Arizona, reflect that state law can erect significant obsta-
cles to a state's desire to extend public funding to private schooling.
1. Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program
Florida has experimented with several voucher programs to enable
students to attend private schools at public expense. In 1999, it enacted
the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), which provided vouchers
118. Id.
119. Palin Lauded for Attention to Special Ed, Not Vouchers, specialedconnection.com
(Oct28, 2008).
120. Obama and the AFT, N.Y. SuN, July 14,2008, at 2.
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to low-income children attending public schools that repeatedly failed to
meet Florida's standardized rating system. 2' In many respects, OSP was
similar to the McKay scholarship, which was enacted the following year.
Both programs allowed eligible students to transfer to a better public
school or to use public funding at a private school.'22 Neither program
imposed significant accountability provisions on private schools partic-
ipating in the programs .23
The legality of OSP was ultimately challenged in state court by mul-
tiple groups, including some parents of children in public schools and
Florida's teacher's union.24 Plaintiffs claimed that OSP violated the state
constitution's mandate to provide for "the education of all children
residing within its borders" and provide "by law for a uniform, efficient,
safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows
students to obtain a high quality education.' 25 They further argued that
public support of private schools violated Article IX, § 6 of the state con-
stitution, which restricts use of the state school fund "only to the support
and maintenance of free public schools."'26 Plaintiffs also maintained
that the provision of public money to religious schools constituted state
endorsement of religion in violation of both Article I, § 3 of the state
constitution and the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause. While the
case was pending, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which held that publicly-funded school
choice programs are consistent with the federal Establishment Clause so
long as the program is the product of "true private choice."'27 As a result,
the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their challenge under federal law,
and the litigation proceeded on state law grounds alone.28
In early 2006, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Opportunity
Scholarship was in "direct conflict" with Article IX, § 1 (a)'s mandate to
provide "a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free
public schools."'29 It reasoned that "[t]he OSP violates this provision by
121. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So2d 392,397 (Fla. 2006) (discussing OSP).
122. Id.
123. Compare Parrish, supra note 2 with Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 409-410 (Fla.
2006) (discussing OSP's lack of accountability provisions).
124. Holmes v. Bush, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
125. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d at 397-98 (quoting Art. IX, § l(a), Fla. Const.).
126. Id. at 410. See also Andrew J. Coulson, Is it Really 'Public'Education if Voters Get No
Say?, ORLANDo Serruq, Sept. 2, 2008, at A7 (naming Florida teacher's union as the primary
challenger of the law).
127. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
128. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 399.
129. Id. at 405-06.
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devoting the state's resources to the education of children within our state
through means other than a system of free public schools. 1 3' Because the
state lacked oversight over the private schools and teachers participating
in the program, it could not guarantee the uniformity required by the state
constitution. 3' The court suggested, however, that a voucher program
could potentially satisfy this constitutional standard if it provided neces-
sary services that public schools could not offer.3 2 Having invalidated the
statute, the court declined to consider whether OSP violated the estab-
lishment clause of the Florida constitution as well. 33
For whatever reason, the litigants in Bush v. Holmes chose not to chal-
lenge the McKay scholarship directly, despite its marked similarity to
OSP. It is unlikely that McKay would fall within the court's exception of
providing services that public schools cannot offer, since this would be
akin to an admission that the state cannot provide FAPE to students with
disabilities in the public schools. Such an admission would require the
state to pay for the full tuition and fees of the private school rather than
the limited funding provided through the voucher program.'s
Nevertheless, the legislature to date has not addressed how McKay dif-
fers from the invalidated OSP, and students continue to receive McKay
scholarships."' Notably, fourteen states have similar uniformity clauses
in their state constitutions, which ultimately could derail the adoption of
a special needs voucher program.'36
2. Arizona: Scholarships for Pupils with Disabilities'37
The Arizona Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities was implement-
ed in late 2006. Very similar in scope to the McKay Scholarship, this
legislation provided that students who had "spent the prior school year
130. Id. at 407.
131. Id. at 409.
132. Id.at 411-412.
133. Id. at 413.
134. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
135. See S.V. Date, School Vouchers Lose Champions with Bush's Exit, PALM BEACH POST
IA (March 17, 2007) (quoting Ron Meyer, head of a Florida teacher's union, as saying "There
seems to be some bills [to expand McKay] as though there were no Bush vs. Holmes"); Florida
School Vouchers Flunk Test, ST PETERSBURG TIMES (July 1, 2009) ("The same flaws [identified
in the Opportunity Scholarship] are evident in the remaining two programs: the Corporate Tax
Credit voucher and the McKay Scholarships for disabled students."), available at
http://www.tampabay.comlopirionleditorials/articlelO14720.ece.
136. See Jamie Dycus, Lost Opportunity: Bush v. Holmes and the Application of State
Constitutional Uniformity Clauses to School Voucher Schemes, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 415,418 (2006).
137. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-891 et seq. (2007).
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in attendance at a public school" and also had an IEP plan in place were
eligible to attend either a public school in an adjacent district or any
"qualified" private school.'38 Approximately 124,500 students in Arizona
were eligible to participate in the program in its inaugural year.139
Whether a school was considered "qualified" was left almost exclu-
sively to parental discretion. 4 ° The statute's only requirement was that a
school be "located in this state and ... not discriminate on the basis of
race, color, handicap, familial status or national origin.' 41 The state's
website made clear that all private schools met this definition, and that
the Department of Education had "no authority to evaluate and deter-
mine whether a private school meets the criteria to be considered a qual-
ified school."'42 The statute contained no teacher qualification require-
ments. Once a student elected to take a scholarship, the state had no fur-
ther involvement in monitoring the child's academic performance or the
quality of his or her educational experience.43
The funding for this program was limited to a set amount designated
by the legislature, which in 2006 was $2.5 million awarded on a "first-
come, first serve" [sic] basis. 4 The scholarship total was calculated at
the lesser of (1) the cost of the chosen school's tuition and fees or actu-
al per pupil cost, whichever was greater, or (2) the amount the public
school would have received for the student pursuant to Arizona's special
education law. In 2006-2007, the thirty-four students participating in the
program received awards ranging between $3,000 and $23,000, with an
average award amount of $7,735.
In February 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the
American Way, and several educational organizations filed a challenge
to the Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities on the ground that it vio-
lated the state's constitution."4 They argued that because the scholarship
138. Id. § 15-891(A)-(B).
139. See Comments of Dan LaDolce, Arizona Department of Education, Office of
Exceptional Student Services, reported at http://www.azschoolchoice.com/programs.aspx?
IICatlD=0&IIID=2814.
140. See Arizona Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities FAQ, #12, available at
http://www.ade.az.gov/hb2676/FAQs.doc.
141. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-891(F)(2).
142. See http://www.ade.az.govfhb2676/.
143. See Arizona Scholarship for Pupils with Disabilities FAQ #21, available at
http://www.ade.az.gov/hb2676/FAQs.doc.
144. See Arizona Scholarships for Pupils with Disabilities Program Application,
http://www.tusd.k12.az.us/contents/Documents/ParentApplication9-06.doc.
145. See http://www.ed.gov/parents/schools/choice/educationoptions/report-pg8.hatml.
146. Cain v. Home, 2007 WL 1891530 (Ariz. Sup. June 14, 2007).
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could be used at religious schools, it violated Article II, § 12 (the
"Religion Clause"), which provides that "[n]o public money ... shall be
appropriated to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the
support of any religious establishment."'47 They likewise argued that it
violated Article IX, § 10 (the "Aid Clause"), which prohibits any "tax.
. or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or pri-
vate or sectarian school, or any public service corporation."'48 Following
in Florida's footsteps, the plaintiffs also claimed that the scholarship vio-
lated the constitution's requirement of "a 'general and uniform public
school system" which is "open to all the children of the State and...
free from sectarian control .... "'I"
The defendants countered that the court's inquiry should be guided by
the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris" as
described above.' Defendants further argued that the scholarship did
not constitute an appropriation of public money for private schools
because students, rather than private institutions, were the "true benefi-
ciaries" of the public appropriation.'52
The superior court upheld the scholarship program, concluding that it
was constitutional under each of these provisions. 3 Although the court
of appeals agreed with respect to the Religion Clause, it struck down the
program on the ground that it violated the Aid Clause of the state con-
stitution."M In early 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the
latter finding.' 5 The court reasoned that the program constituted a direct
transfer of funds from the state treasury to private schools in violation of
Article IX, § 10. The court found it "immaterial" that parents were
required to endorse the scholarship check, reasoning that "once a pupil
has been accepted into a qualified school under either program, the par-
ents or guardians have no choice; they must endorse the check or war-
rant to the qualified school."'" It concluded that employing the "true
147. Cain v. Home, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Ariz. 2009) (detailing defendants' arguments).
148. Id.
149. Az. CONST. Art. XX, §7; Art. XI, § 1 (cited in Home, 2007 WL 1891530 at *1).
150. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
151. See Cain, 202 P.3d at 1182 (detailing defendants' arguments).
152. Id. at 1183-84.
153. Cain v. Home, 2007 WL 1891530 (Ariz. Sup. June 14,2007).
154. Caine v. Home, 183 P.3d 1269, 1277-78 (Az. App. 2008). The court declined to deter-
mine whether the scholarship program violated the other sections of the state constitution identi-
fied by the plaintiff. Id. at 1278.
155. Cain, 202 P3d at 1184.
156. Id.
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beneficiary" test in such circumstances would render Article IX, § 10 a
nullity, and therefore was impermissible' 57 Notably, the court declined to
answer the additional question of whether the program constituted state
support of religion in violation of Article II, § 12.1m
As a result of the court's decision, all students participating in the pro-
gram lost their state-funded scholarships at the end of the 2008-2009
school year. Because many state constitutions include provisions similar
to those at stake in the Arizona litigation, 5 9 the logic of this case may
serve as a significant check to the establishment of voucher programs in
the future.
B. Conflicts with Federal Legislation
The legal arguments raised in state court challenges to voucher pro-
grams are unlikely to result in equivalent federal concerns. In the wake
of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, it is highly unlikely that a court would
conclude that a properly structured voucher program violates the feder-
al Establishment Clause." There likewise are no federal equivalents to
the state constitutional provisions requiring the establishment of a uni-
form system of public schools or prohibiting the provision of public
funds to private schools. 6' The question remains, however, whether
voucher programs conflict with federal education and civil rights laws,
including the IDEA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,'62 and Americans
with Disabilities Act. 63
Both Georgia and Utah provide that a parent's decision to accept a
special needs voucher "shall have the same effect as a parental refusal to
consent to services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act."'" With the exception of Ohio's autism scholarship,
moreover, no existing or proposed program requires participating pri-
vate schools to implement an IEP as contemplated by the IDEA.' 65 To
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1185, n.4.
159. See, e.g., Cain v. Home, 183 P.3d at 1277-78 (discussing decisions in other states with
similar constitutional provisions).
160. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,662 (2002).
161. See, e.g., Cain v. Home, 183 P.3d at 1273 (noting that Arizona's Aid Clause has "no
equivalent in the United States Constitution").
162. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
163.42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
164. GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-1-2114(f); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-704(5)(a)(iii).
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
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date, no state or federal court has addressed whether these provisions
conflict with federal law. There is administrative guidance, however,
suggesting such waivers are permissible under the IDEA.
1. Application of the IDEA
The U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has
twice opined that students with disabilities who voluntarily participate in
voucher programs waive most of their rights under the IDEA. It first did
so in a July 1990 Staff Memorandum evaluating whether EAHCA, the
IDEA's predecessor, applied to the Milwaukee Choice Program (MCP),
a fixed-amount voucher offered to low-income general and special edu-
cation children in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.166 Although acknowledging
that "[t]hese constitute exceedingly difficult issues of first impression
for the Department," OCR concluded that when a parent elects to accept
a private school voucher, the child in question is "parentally placed" for
purposes of EAHCA, freeing school districts from the requirement to
provide FAPE to that child.67 OCR was not persuaded that the state's
partial subsidization of the child's education constituted a public agency
placement under the statute, triggering its procedural and substantive
protections. Reasoning that public agency placements are made by the
statutory IEP team, while parents act as the "key decisionmaker[s]" in
school choice programs, OCR concluded FAPE did not apply to partic-
ipating children unless and until they chose to return to public school.' 6
The agency restated this conclusion in 2001 in the context of Florida's
McKay Scholarship, 69 affirming that children who accept scholarships
will be treated as "private school children with disabilities" with "no
individual entitlement to FAPE [or] related services" under the IDEA.70
Recognizing the significance of this conclusion, OCR "strongly recom-
mend[ed] that the State or local education agency notify parents who
choose private school placement under the Scholarship Program that the
student may retain certain rights under Section 504 and Title II of the
166. OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 IDELR 669, 670 (July 27, 1990).
167. Id. at 669-670.
168. Id. at 670-671.
169. Letter to Bowen, 35 IDELR 129 (OCR March 23, 2001).
170. Id. at 130.
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ADA, although the student will not be entitled to [FAPE] under IDEA,
while enrolled in private school."17
The treatment of voucher recipients as private school students with
disabilities for purposes of the IDEA is significant in a number of
respects. The statute requires each LEA to locate, identify, and evaluate
children with disabilities who are enrolled by parents in private schools
within the school district.' Once identified, however, these children
have no individual enforceable right to special education and related
services under the IDEA."r Although the LEA must consider the needs
of each private school student with disabilities, it can refuse to provide
special education or related services to any particular student once it has
engaged in "meaningful consultation."'74 Having required parental waiv-
er of IDEA rights in order to participate in voucher programs, it is
unlikely that a state would then willingly provide additional funding or
services to these same students once enrolled in private school.
The IDEA's extensive due process rights likewise do not apply to pri-
vate school students with disabilities. Instead, such rights attach only to
complaints regarding the LEA's responsibility to identify, locate, and
evaluate these students .75 As Professor Mark Weber has concluded, this
leaves school districts with "tremendous amounts of unreviewable deci-
sion making power" over the provision of services to students attending
private schools.' 76 There is no available avenue to challenge the state's
decisions when disagreements arise in this area. A parent's acceptance of
a special needs voucher, therefore, effectively waives all meaningful
protection under the IDEA for his or her child.
The designation of children receiving vouchers as private school stu-
dents for purposes of the IDEA also potentially affects the amount of
federal funds available for students with disabilities who remain in pub-
lic school. Federal special education funds primarily are allocated
according to the total number of private and public school students edu-
cated within a particular school district."7 As discussed earlier, the IDEA
171. Id. Interestingly, despite OCR's concern about the potential for "parental misunder-
standing" in this regard, no voucher program apparently includes such notice.
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.131(a) (2009).
173. 34 C.F.R. § 300.138(a) (2009). See also Weber, supra note 113, at 182. There may,
however, be an entitlement to services under state law. Id. at 182-189.
174. Letter to Mendelson, 49 IDELR 198 (OSEPAug. 25,2007); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.131-134
(2008).
175. 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(a) (2008).
176. Weber, supra note 113, at 204-205.
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A) (2006). See also Weber, supra note 113, at 175.
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requires school districts to set aside a portion of this funding, in an
amount proportionate to the number of children with disabilities
enrolled in private schools within the district, to provide special educa-
tion and related services to private school students with disabilities.'78 As
an increasing number of students with disabilities matriculate into pri-
vate schools as a result of voucher programs, their proportionate share
of federal dollars necessarily grows. If the number of students receiving
vouchers is sufficiently large, this reallocation could appreciably dimin-
ish the money available to educate students with disabilities who remain
in the public schools.
In fact, to some degree, this has already occurred in Florida, which is
home to the largest disability voucher program. Florida initially treated
McKay students as having waived all rights under the IDEA upon
accepting a special needs scholarship. In keeping with this position,
school districts did not count McKay scholarship students when calcu-
lating the proportionate share of federal IDEA money to allocate to pri-
vate school students with disabilities. In 2006, however, OCR directed
Florida to change this practice and include all students with disabilities
in their count. 7 9 As a result, many counties were forced unexpectedly to
budget significant additional funding to service the needs of children in
private school. In Broward County, for example, the addition of McKay
students raised the number of private school students with disabilities
from 100 to 1,600 children, requiring an additional $1.5 million to be
allocated to private school students with disabilities. 8 This represented
a direct loss to the students with disabilities in the public schools, who
tend to have more severe impairments than those experienced by McKay
scholarship students." '
2. Application of § 504 and the ADA
Although the waiver of meaningful protection under the IDEA is
problematic for parents accepting vouchers, the consequences of such
178. See Weber, supra note 113, at 174-75.
179. Nirvi Shah, New Rule Shifts More Tax Bucks for Disabled to Private Schools, PALM
BEAcH POST, May 10, 2006, at IA. The author has confirmed that Georgia also counts special needs
scholarship recipients in allocating private school proportionate funds. See E-mail Correspondence
with Nancy O'Hara, Georgia Dept. of Educ. (August 31,2009) (on file with author).
180. Id. Palm Beach county added approximately 1000 students with disabilities to its pri-
vate school allocation, requiring more than six times the original allocation of $200,000. Id.
181. Id. See also discussion infra at Part IV.
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waivers would be limited to the extent that § 504 or the ADA provide
similar protection to students with disabilities, either by regulating the
private schools directly or through regulation of the state agencies
administering voucher programs. A close look reveals, however, that the
protection these statutes extend to private school students is relatively
minimal.
All non-religious private schools are covered as "public accommoda-
tions" under Title III of the ADA, u and as such, are precluded from dis-
criminating on the basis of disability." Among other things, this prohibi-
tion requires private schools to make reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures where such modifications are necessary for stu-
dents with disabilities and do not represent a fundamental alteration of the
academic program."8 Title III also precludes private schools from refusing
to allow a qualified student with a disability to participate in their pro-
grams or imposing unnecessary eligibility requirements that tend to screen
out such students.'85 To ensure inclusion, private schools must provide
auxiliary aids and services where necessary to facilitate communication
with students with disabilities, and architectural barriers must be removed
where it is readily achievable to do so.'86
Although these general protections are not insignificant, Title III's
impact is limited because the statute does not require private schools to
develop or implement individualized education plans or accommoda-
tions for students with disabilities.'" There likewise is no entitlement to
the procedural guarantees extended by the IDEA. 8 Such protection, if it
is to be found at all, must arise out of § 504 or Title II of the ADA.
The antidiscrimination mandate of § 504, which includes an obligation
to provide FAPE, extends to "any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance," including both sectarian and religious schools."
182.42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (2006) (identifying "nursery, elementary, secondary...or other
place of education" as a public accommodation); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2009). Notably, Title
III's exemption of parochial schools is "broad." Marshall v. Sisters of the Holy Family of
Nazareth, 399 F. Supp. 2d 597 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
183.42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv).
187. See Woodatch (Private Schools), 9 ND.L.R. 42 (May 2, 1996) (DOJ); Bercovitch v.
Baldwin School, 133 F.3d 141, 152 (1st Cir. 1998).
188. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12188 with 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). See also Hunt v. St. Peter School, 963 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Mo
1997) (applying 504 to Catholic school that had received federal funding through Title I and the
school lunch program).
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OCR has taken the position that private schools accepting vouchers do not
fall within this coverage so long as the voucher programs are financed
exclusively with state funds and not commingled with federal money."
Accordingly, §504 does not directly regulate the conduct of participating
private schools unless they receive federal funding through another pro-
gram, such as Title I or school lunch programs.
Initially, there was some argument that § 504 indirectly regulated pri-
vate schools participating in voucher programs because their receipt of
public funds transformed them into state contractors. OCR disagreed
and rejected this position in its 1990 Staff Memorandum.1 9' Reasoning
that "parents are the operative decision-makers" in the program, "and no
LEA participation is involved," OCR concluded that participating pri-
vate schools remained exempt from coverage under the federal statute. 92
Based on the same rationale, private schools accepting voucher funds do
not thereby become "public entities" subject to coverage under Title II
of the ADA. Accordingly, neither statute directly governs the conduct of
private schools that do not otherwise accept federal funding.
There is no question, however, that each State Educational Agency
(SEA) receives federal financial assistance and is covered by both § 504
and Title II as a public entity.93 This coverage applies to all of the SEA's
operations, including its administration of any special needs voucher
program.94 Federal regulations preclude states from "providing signifi-
cant assistance to an agency ... that discriminates on the basis of hand-
icap in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the recip-
ients program or activity," which would include participating private
schools. 95 They do not, however, "further elaborate on what constitutes
discrimination.""
The protection provided to students with disabilities via this provision
in reality is relatively minimal. Section 504 permits private schools to
establish selective admissions criteria when such criteria are based on
190. OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 IDELR at 671-673; Letter to Bowen, 35 IDELR at 129.
In support of this conclusion, OCR noted the "longstanding Departmental policy" that benefits
extended to private school students with disabilities "via the SEA and LEA's obligations [under
the IDEA] to provide for 'equitable services"' do not result in coverage under § 504. OCR Staff
Memorandum, 22 IDELR at 671.
191. Id.at 672.
192.Id.
193. Id. at 673-674.
194. Id.
195. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(v).
196. OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 IDELR at 674.
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legitimate academic policies ."9 Thus, although the state must ensure that
private schools do not exclude students with disabilities who "can, with
minor adjustments, be provided an appropriate education within the
school's program," '98 it has no obligation to ensure that "private schools
provide an appropriate education to ... students [with disabilities] with
special educational needs if [the participating private schools do] not
offer programs designed to meet those needs.""' Even for those students
with disabilities who are admitted, there is no requirement that partici-
pating schools develop an IEP, ensure adequate educational progress, or
provide procedural protections .2° As a result, the protections afforded by
federal law to voucher students are inconsequential in comparison to the
legal rights waived by parents upon acceptance of state assistance for
private school.
V. THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF VOUCHER
PROGRAMS
The debate over the quality of public versus private education is hard-
ly new. For years, interest groups have advocated either for the merits of
school choice or the need to maintain the integrity of the public school
system. The stakes change, however, when the conversation turns to the
merits of outsourcing the education of students with disabilities. In light
of the vulnerability of this population and the potential for discrimina-
tion, it is critical to evaluate whether the benefits they secure from
vouchers can exceed or even match the substantive benefits and legal
protection that are tied to public placements. The remainder of this arti-
cle critically evaluates where private school vouchers for students with
disabilities fall along this continuum. The first section evaluates the pro-
grammatic aspects of enacted voucher legislation to assess whether they
are consistent with the heightened educational requirements of special
197. St. Johnsbury Academy v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding pri-
vate schools refusal to admit student with disabilities where student did not perform at or above
grade level).
198. 34 C.FR. § 104.39(a) (2008). Although "minor adjustments" is not defined in the reg-
ulation, at least one court has suggested that it is akin to the substantive requirement of reason-
able accommodation. Ireland v. Kansas Dist. Of Wesleyan Church, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11367
(D. Kan. 1994).
199. Letter to Bowen, 35 IDELR at 129-130 (citing 34 C.F.R. Part 10439 (a)).
200. OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 IDELR at 670-71.
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needs children. The concluding section explores the desirability of
voucher programs for students with disabilities generally, evaluating
their consistency with the IDEA's goal of integrating students with dis-
abilities into the mainstream of society.
A. Programmatic Concerns with Voucher Programs for Students
with Disabilities
The school choice movement is grounded in the belief that the private
sector can provide educational services to all students more effectively
and efficiently than can public institutions. Many adherents distrust gov-
ernmental control and regulation, instead placing their faith in the free
market system. As a result, most existing voucher programs for students
with disabilities lack meaningful public oversight of participating private
schools. Notably, this lack of regulation is not accidental, but instead an
intentional, and to some proponents, instrumental aspect of such pro-
grams. In the context of children with disabilities, this lack of accounta-
bility, structure, and legal protection can pose serious challenges.
1. Lack of Specialized Instruction
Education for children with disabilities is considered "special" because
it employs instructional inputs specially tailored to reflect both a stu-
dent's individual abilities and limitations in a school setting."' Depending
upon the disability at issue, this process can be highly specialized, requir-
ing significant training and education in best practices and instructional
techniques to maximize student outcomes.' 2 The development of IEPs
mandated by the IDEA is intended to check and facilitate this process,
identifying specific goals for each eligible child during the school year
and establishing meaningful benchmarks to measure the child's progress
in meeting such goals throughout the year.2"'
Some states, however, do not require private schools participating in
special needs vouchers to inform parents of the individualized instruction
and services that will be provided to their child upon matriculation." 4
201. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006) (describing contents of IEP). See also Hensel, supra
note 2, at 1174-75 (discussing meaning of "special education").
202. See President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education, A NEw ERA:
REVITALIZING SpEciAL EDUCATION FOR CHiUREN AND THEIR FAMiLms (July 2002).
203. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
204. See infra Part IIA.
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Although parental choice is often highlighted as a strength of voucher
programs, the information necessary make informed choices is often
lacking. In Florida, for example, 29% of the surveyed parents that partic-
ipated in the McKay scholarship program in one county agreed that
"information on special education programs was difficult to obtain."2 5
Even more troubling, 50% of parents of public special education students
in the study's survey reported that they "were not able to get the infor-
mation they had wanted, ' 2° particularly on the subjects of "quality of
teachers, academic quality, and special education programs. ' '27 This lack
of information in some cases has led to disturbing results. Parents have
been surprised to find after enrollment that services received from the pri-
vate school are in no way comparable to those set forth in their child's
IEP.1° The only remedy a parent can exercise at this point is the highly
disruptive option of moving their child to another school.
There unquestionably are a number of excellent private schools in
each state that specialize in the education of children with disabilities
and offer individualized instruction well suited to the meet the needs of
these students .2" There is evidence to suggest, however, that the majori-
ty of children accepting special needs vouchers attend private schools
with little or no differentiated programming. One study in Florida, for
example, found that 77% of the schools accepting McKay students pro-
vided no special program of any kind for disabled students.2 ° When
asked whether the state was concerned about such statistics, one Florida
official commented that this "did not present a problem because about
85% of McKay voucher recipients have only a mild learning disability,"
which may simply require a smaller learning environment."
205. See Virginia R. Weidner, THE McKAY SCHOLARSr'S FOR STUDENTS wrrH DISABILITIES:
PARENTS USE OF INFORMATON AND INFORMATION SOURCES 179 (Mar. 4,2005) (unpublished Ed.D
dissertation, Florida State University College of Education) (on file with Florida State University
College of Education).
206. Id. at 179-80.
207. Id. at 104.
208. See, e.g., Kimberly Miller, Safeguards Few for Disability Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST,
Dec. 8, 2003, at IA (quoting public school educator as saying, "I get calls all the time from par-
ents who say their child's speech or writing isn't improving in the private school, and that's
because the school doesn't have a strategist working individually with their child ... The parents
are always surprised.").
209. See, e.g., Greene and Forster, supra note 12.
210. See S. V. Date, Concern Voiced Over Voucher School's Lack of Special Ed, PALM
BEACH POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at 9A (noting that 496 of the 641 participating schools lacked spe-
cial programs).
211. See id.
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To the extent that this position is correct, it challenges the assumption
that private schools are superior providers of special education and relat-
ed services to children with disabilities. There is no question that public
schools would enthusiastically embrace small class sizes to the extent
that funding is made available to do so. The voucher discussion, howev-
er, focuses on outsourcing students with disabilities rather than improv-
ing the delivery of education in the public setting. This may suggest that
at least some programs are primarily focused on changing the setting in
which services are provided rather than ensuring the superiority of the
services delivered. Notably, Florida's Governor Jeb Bush sought to
overturn the state constitution's provision limiting public school class
size despite his support of the McKay scholarship.2 At least some crit-
ics have argued that his primary motivation for doing so was to support
religious education rather than the needs of students with disabilities.213
If that is the case, then these programs have been quite successful. In
some states, the majority of schools accepting special needs vouchers
are religiously based. In Florida, for example, more than 64% of the
schools eligible to receive scholarship students were identified as "reli-
gious," and 52% of students receiving vouchers attended religious
schools.2 4 In Georgia, approximately 45% of participating schools are
identifiably affiliated with religion.2"5 This trend is likely to continue,
moreover, because "religious school[s] have been entering the market to
provide options for parents with students with disabilities at a much
faster rate than private non-religious schools."2 '6 Although some reli-
gious schools laudably have developed programs specifically designed
212. Linda Kleindienst, Revise Class-Size Limits, Bush Says Constitution Would Have to Be
Changed, S. FLA. SuN SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2005 at IA.
213. See Correct Voucher Policy, PALM BEACH POST, May 13, 2006 at 14A.
214. See McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 6. Significantly, the majority of
minority children who use McKay vouchers attend religious schools. See Weidner, supra note
205, at 97 (study in Duval County finding that 61.02% of African-Americans in sample attended
religious school versus 35.54% of White, Non-Hispanic students).
215. See Georgia Dept. of Educ., 2009-2010 SCHOOL YEAR GEORGIA SPECIAL NEEDS
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FINAL AmiORzE PARTICIPATING PRiVATE SCHOOLS LIST (AUG. 13, 2009),
available at http://public.doe.k12.ga.us/DMGetDocument.aspx/GSNS%2OSchool%20list%2for%
20post%2OFinal%20Aug.pdfp=6CC6799F8C 1371F65B4F476D201B5224E5B34D4B8A56A13
30194A90B77C2DDE6&Type=D.
216. Weidner, supra note 205, at 177. But see Andrea Falkenhagen, Vouchers for Disabled
Students Go Unused, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Apr. 16, 2007 (noting that in the first year of the
Arizona scholarship, "[l]ess than $40,000 of the money approved - 15 percent of the money spent
on vouchers this year - has gone to sectarian schools.").
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to meet the needs of children with disabilities,2 17 many are poorly
equipped to meet the instructional demands of this population."8
Because students with disabilities are, by definition, those most in need
of individualized education, the dominance of religious schools in
voucher programs would seem problematic.
2. Limited Teacher Qualifications
If private schools accepting public vouchers provide superior teaching
over the public schools, the lack of differentiated instruction may be of
less significance for children with disabilities. Research shows that
"highly qualified teachers significantly increase student learning out-
comes" and "contribute... more to student achievement" than any other
variable in quality education.2"9 The disability community recognizes
this and has advocated for increased funding of teacher training as an
essential component of student achievement.220
Federal education legislation over the last decade has increasingly
codified the professional requirements necessary for highly skilled
teachers. The No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB")22' is a striking exam-
ple in this regard, requiring all personnel teaching core academic sub-
jects in Title I schools to be "highly qualified," or have a minimum of a
bachelors degree and full state certification or licensing, among other
requirements.222 The statute also gives parents the right to know the
217. The Sophia Academy in Georgia, for example, describes itself as "the only Christian
school devoted solely to students with learning differences." See The Sophia Academy website,
http://www.sophiaacademy.org/history.html. See also Van Lier, supra note 88, at 12 (describing
religious schools which specialize in the education of autistic students).
218. See, e.g., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Dept. of Educ., CATHOLIC SCHOOL
CHILDREN wrrH DisABIrms 12 (Nov. 2002) ("Eighty-seven percent of the dioceses report that
some of their schools are unable to enroll students because they do not have the capacity to meet
the special needs of the students."); Patricia Bauer, Few Catholic Schools Offer Special
Education (February 10, 200), available at http://www.patriciaebauer.com/2009/02/10/catholic-
schools-special-education/; Michael Paulson, Religious Schools Look to Fill Special-Education
Needs, THE BOSTON GLOBE (June 27,2005) ("Jewish community leaders say that many of the day
schools have been unable or unwilling to accommodate children with special needs, especially
those whose needs are the most complex.").
219. J. Matt Jameson and Dixie S. Huefner, "Highly Qualified" Special Educators and the
Provision of a Free Appropriate Public Education to Students with Disabilities, 35 J.I. & Enuc.
29, 30, n.5 (2006) (surveying current literature).
220. Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting
Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 24 (2004).
221.20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2002).
222. 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2)(A) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§
20055(a), 20056 (2008). This includes paraprofessionals who have teaching responsibilities. 20
U.S.C. § 6319(c) (2006).
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teaching credentials and professional qualifications of all instructional
staff.2 3 Notably, this sweeping legislation was supported by politicians
and advocacy groups who otherwise oppose federal intervention into
public school systems."2
Congress made clear that the "highly qualified" teacher requirements
extend to special educators during the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA.
Although the definition includes more flexibility for this group, it like-
wise requires teachers to have at least a bachelor's degree and either full
certification as a special educator or successful completion of a state's
special education licensing exam .225 At least one scholar has argued that
these changes, coupled with IDEA's regulatory guidance, "implicitly
recognize that special education cannot be appropriate without qualified
teachers and other qualified personnel to provide teacher services. 226
In contrast to the detailed professional teaching credentials required at
the federal level, there is virtually no consideration of teacher qualifica-
tions in voucher programs. In order to enroll students receiving vouchers,
schools in Florida and Utah need only ensure that they employ teachers
with "special skills, knowledge, or expertise ... "27 The breadth of these
terms suggests that almost any adult potentially could meet this minimal
threshold. Certainly, there is no expectation that teachers have a college
degree or even a high school diploma in order to lead the classroom.
There is no question that many participating private schools will volun-
tarily impose more stringent requirements on its teachers than these pro-
grams. Likewise, there undoubtedly are some individuals who would not
meet the federal standards but who nevertheless may be exemplary teach-
ers. The complete absence of quality control over teaching, however, runs
counter to wealth of evidence reflecting the significance of education,
training, and professional development on teaching effectiveness. "8
223. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(6) (2006); 34 C.FR. § 200.61(a) (2008).
224. Rosenbaum, supra note 220, at 26.
225. 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(14) (2006). For a general discussion of the highly qualified special
educator requirement in the IDEA, see Jameson and Hueffner, supra note 219, at 34-36.
226. Rosenbaum, supra note 220, at 32.
227. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.421(2)(h); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 53A-la-705(1)(g).
228. See, e.g., Yin Cheong Cheng et al, Towards a New Knowledge Base of Teaching
Effectiveness, in TEACHING EFrivENEss AND TEACHER DEVELOPMEN. TOWARDS A NEW
KNOWLEDGE BASE 6 (2001) (Cheong Cheng et al, ed.) ("There is recurrent evidence in the
literature that teacher development is a major way to help teachers change their role, improve
their performance, and become effective in teaching."); Yin Cheong Chang et a], Research and
Analysis of Teaching Effectiveness and Teacher Development, in id. at 28 ("It is commonly
accepted that the teacher is the key element for the success of school education .... ").
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Students with disabilities are eligible under the IDEA in part because they
need individualized education and related services in order to benefit from
instruction. It strains common sense to conclude that teachers with "spe-
cial skills" will systematically educate this challenging population more
effectively than the highly qualified professionals in public schools. As
such, voucher programs would seem to fail in their objective of providing
superior services to children with disabilities.
3. Lack of Accountability
Legislatures that have adopted voucher programs presumably do so on
the basis that private schools may be better equipped to serve the needs
of students with disabilities. Programmatic concerns are of little signifi-
cance if voucher programs result in a superior education for this popu-
lation. It is virtually impossible to determine whether this is correct,
however, because special needs voucher programs require no substan-
tive measure of academic achievement from participating students.9
Significantly, this is not the result of oversight by lawmakers, but rather
one of intentional design.23 Many advocates of voucher programs
believe that the private sector can deliver services more effectively than
the government because it is not hindered by regulatory requirements.
This is reflected in the actions of one prominent school choice advoca-
cy group, which will decrease the "grade" it awards to special needs
voucher programs when states require any teaching credentialing or
school accreditation.
As a result, none of the existing programs require standardized testing
or assessment other than Ohio's autism program, which retains some
229. See, e.g., Greene & Winters, supra note 9, at *5 (noting that because McKay scholarship
students "are not required to take the state's standardized exams, we have no information on their
performance after they leave public school and thus no basis for evaluating McKay's impact on
them.").
230. S.V. Date, Lack of Voucher Accountability Comes Back to Sting Proponent, PALM
BEAcH POST June 30,2004, at 13A (noting that the lack of accountability provisions in Florida in
part arose as a result of pressure from interest groups opposed to such oversight); Enlow, supra
note 10, at 20 ("School choice programs exist to give students more options and parents more
freedom. Thus it goes against the purpose of such a program to impose unnecessary regulations
on participating schools.); Christina Samuels, Analysis Criticizes Ohio Vouchers Targeting
Students with Autism, EDUC. WEEK (March 27, 2008) ("Those who run the voucher program at
the state level say it was created expressly to have few bureaucratic barriers between parents and
the money.").
231. Enlow, supra note 10, at 26-29. See also David Salisbury, School Choice Movement
Must Fight Restrictions on Private School, Cato Institute (May 8, 2003), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=3089.
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control over the child's IEP.232 Although most allow students to partici-
pate in public standardized testing upon parental request, there is no pro-
vision for formal notice of when such testing will occur or solicitation of
private school students.233 Instead, participating private schools at most
are required to give parents a written account of student progress at least
once per year.2" There is no suggestion as to what should be included in
such accounts and no assurance of an objective measure against which
to assess a student's progress.
This absence of accountability is certain to leave at least some chil-
dren with disabilities worse off upon exiting from public school. This
was painfully clear in Florida in the early years of its program, when a
notable number of participating private schools were found to have
employed criminals, engaged in fraud, and failed to deliver educational
services to students with disabilities.235 In 2006, Florida's legislature
passed additional accountability measures in an attempt to end these
practices and ensure a quality education for program recipients.236 Even
these accountability provisions, however, were described as so weak as
to be "laughable" by one state paper.237 To date, Florida has ignored a
coalition of private schools calling for accreditation requirements for
schools participating in the McKay program.238 Florida likewise has cho-
sen not to require McKay students to undergo standardized testing even
though it requires students in its voucher program for low-income stu-
dents, the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship (FTC), to do so.239 Notably, one
study analyzing the data available as a result of this testing concluded
232. See infra Part II.B.
233. See infra Part II.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., S.V. Date, Lack of Voucher Accountability Comes Back to Sting Proponent,
PALM BEAcH POST, June 30, 2004, at 13A (discussing incidents of fraud in Florida voucher pro-
gram).
236. See infra Part II.A.1.
237. Correct Voucher Policy, PALM BEAcH POST 14A (May 13, 2006).
238. In Florida, several private schools urged lawmakers to restrict McKay vouchers to
accredited schools. Date, supra note 235 (discussing efforts of Larry Keough, representative of
Florida Catholic Conference). These groups argued that accreditation not only would ensure a
baseline of quality, but also would "weed[] out school operators who are primarily interested in
making quick money." Id. Although Florida passed a number of accountability reforms in 2006,
accreditation did not survive to the final legislation.
239. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.187(7)(e).
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that participants in FTC performed no better or worse academically than
those who remained in public schools .2'o
To counter such findings, supporters of voucher programs at times
will point to a private study published by the Manhattan Institute which
contains promising data on the McKay scholarship.' The study was
completed in 2003, three years after McKay's implementation. At the
time, the number of children receiving McKay scholarships was less
than half that of the 2008-2009 school year.242 The study includes some
important findings, including the observation that students using McKay
scholarships are significantly less likely to be the victims of bullying in
their private school placement.243 The data also reflects that McKay stu-
dents are in smaller classrooms than their public counterparts ,'I that
many McKay parents feel their children were provided with the servic-
es that they were promised by participating schools, " 5 and that some
McKay students were provided with an IEP or its equivalent.2' 6
Unfortunately, however, the study does not answer the question of
whether students with disabilities have achieved demonstrably better
educational outcomes than those of their public school peers. The study
contains no data against which to measure student progress in academic
subjects or basic skill development, such as reading and writing. As
such, while hopeful, the study cannot make up for the lack of public data
on the superiority of a private education for students with disabilities.
The federal proposals allowing the portability of IDEA funds indicate
that accountability measures would be included in any amendment. 7
Given that proponents of this option have repeatedly referred to the
McKay plan as a model program,2' however, it is unlikely that these
measures would require much beyond a minimal level of communica-
240. David N. Figlio, EVALUATION OF FLORIDA'S CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHoLARstuP
PROGRAM FIRST FoLLow-UP REPoRT - PARTICIPATION, CoMPJANCE AND TEST SCORES IN 2007-08
1-2 (June 16, 2009), available at http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/information/
ctc/files/figliojreport_2009.pdf.
241. Greene and Forster, supra note 12, at 3-4.
242. See McKay Scholarships, supra note 36.
243. Greene and Forster, supra note 12, at 9.
244. Id. at 6.
245. Id. at 7.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Palin Lauded for Attention to Special Ed, Not Vouchers, specialedconnection.com (Oct.
28, 2008).
248. See, e.g.,Text of Sarah Palin's Speech on Advocating for Children with Special Needs
(Oct. 24,2008), available at http://www.lifenews.com/nat4495b.html (referring to McKay schol-
arships).
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tion between parents and participating schools. Imposing more stringent
requirements would conflict both with the stated goal of expanding the
availability of state voucher programs and enhancing states' flexibility in
offering services to children with disabilities.
4. Loss of Legal Protection
The problematic absence of meaningful accountability measures is
exacerbated by the waiver of legal rights required in order for students
with disabilities to participate in special needs vouchers programs. The
Chairperson of the National Council on Disability, whose members are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, has
expressed "deep concerns" to Congress about vouchers' potential to
"seriously undermin[e] the education and civil rights of children with
disabilities ".... 249 This concern is well justified given that parents and
students relinquish virtually all rights under the IDEA upon acceptance
of a voucher. Students thereafter are not entitled to an individualized
education plan, procedural protection when disputes arise, or even a
meaningful education. Instead, if OCR is correct, their legal protection
under the IDEA is limited to their right to be counted when determining
the amount of Part-B funds to set aside for servicing the needs of private
school students.2" This protection provides no enforceable individual
entitlement and is unlikely to result in the state's voluntary provision of
services to voucher students.25'
In exchange for securing a set amount for private schooling, students
with disabilities waive their right to seek full tuition and fees when
school districts fail to meet their obligations under the IDEA. The IDEA
gives parents the ability to file due process claims against districts,
ensuring that their concerns are considered by a neutral third party.252 In
serious cases involving the denial of FAPE, districts can be forced to
reimburse parents for the full expense of private schooling.253 Because it
is significantly cheaper to provide voucher funding, schools violating
249. See Special Education: Is IDEA Working as Congress Intended?: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong.109 (2002) (statement of Marcia Bristro, Chairperson,
National Council on Disability).
250. See infra Part III.B.1.
251. Id.
252. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (detailing procedural protections of IDEA).
253. See School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. 359.
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the IDEA's provisions may actually encourage contentious students to
elect vouchers, thereby skirting their legal obligations.
As discussed above, the coverage provided by the ADA and § 504 can-
not make up for this loss of legal protection. Private schools can lawful-
ly establish selective admissions criteria and exclude students with dis-
abilities where their programs are not "designed to meet those needs" or
where students cannot be accommodated with "minor adjustment[s]."'
They are not obligated to provide a meaningful education and cannot
legally be held accountable when a student makes no academic progress.
While this is problematic for any student, it is particularly troublesome
for students with disabilities who are eligible under the IDEA precisely
because they have individualized, often intense instructional needs that
cannot be met within the traditional curriculum. In the absence of dis-
cernable benchmarks of progress and clearly identified legal rights, there
is a heightened chance that these children will face intentional discrimi-
nation or seemingly benign indifference.
Proponents of vouchers have argued that parents' ability to withdraw
their children from poorly performing schools will be sufficient to ensure
that students are treated well and offered a quality education. 55 There is
no question that a parental exit option can provide meaningful psycho-
logical value to parents, as it ensures that they cannot be held hostage in
poorly performing schools. Its value as a negotiation tool, however, is
limited because of the vulnerability of the population at issue. Students
with disabilities, perhaps more than any other group, have difficulty tol-
erating change in their routines and environments. Friendships, to the
extent that they exist at all, are often the product of long-term relationship
building and development efforts by parents and teachers.256 A change in
254. Letter to Bowen, 35 IDELR at 129-130 (citing 34 C.F.R. Part 104.39 (a)). See also St.
Johnsbury Academy v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163,174 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding private school's refusal
to mainstream student with disabilities where student did not meet school's "'legitimate academ-
ic policy" of performing at or above grade level).
255. See, e.g., Beth Lear and Mathew Carr, Accountability and School Choice, BUCKEYE
INSTITrUTON FOR PUB. POL'Y SOLUTIONS (May 5, 2008) (noting that school choice supporters
argue that "parents hold private schools accountable through choices they make in the education
marketplace"), available at http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/article/1124.
256. See, e.g., Fred Frankel et al., Parent-Assisted Transfer of Children's Social Skills
Training: Effects on Children With and Without Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 36 J.
Am. ACADEMY OF CHm.D & ADoLcESrr PsycH. 1056 (Aug. 1997) (noting peer rejection of chil-
dren with ADHD and the significance of parental training in social skills); Martin Fujiki et al.,
Social Skills of Children with Specific Learning Impairments, 27 LANGUAGE SPEECH AND
HER 'G SERV. IN SCHOOLS 195 (July 1996) (study finding that children with speech-language
impairments had weaker social skills and fewer peer relationships).
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schools can therefore trigger significant behavior problems and academ-
ic difficulties for these children.7 In addition, because of the limited
number of placements that accept students with disabilities, particularly
those with severe disorders, there may be few, if any, academic alterna-
tives parents can pursue short of returning to a public setting. 258 A mid-
year transition to a public school will preclude voucher funding for the
following school year under the terms of eligibility in some states.259 As a
result, the exit option for many parents will provide a choice between the
Scylla and Charybdis-either they must burden their already struggling
child with removal, or they must remain in a school that does not ade-
quately meet their child's needs. In short, the acceptance of vouchers
leaves parents operating with no legal safety net and few meaningful
options when things go wrong.
This transfer of responsibility from the public to individual parents is
a troubling shift from the IDEA's recognition that society at large has a
stake in the successful education of children with disabilities. Although
voucher programs provide parents with additional choices, they also
squarely place the burden of securing an adequate education for their
child on their shoulders alone. This apparently is true even in Ohio,
where parents retain some rights under the IDEA. Education officials
have been quoted as saying, "This is not the public education system.
Parents now have more responsibility; they now have to ensure that the
IEP gets implemented. ' 26
5. The Significance of Parental Satisfaction
Voucher proponents oft-repeated response to the concerns identified
above is that parental satisfaction is the best measure of program success
257. See Anshu Gupta, Mental Health of Children, MENTAL HEALTh REvIEW (2008)
("Frequent change in school, rejection from peers, bullying, often leads to emotional, behavioral
and academic problems"), available at http://www.psyplexus.com/mhr/mentalhealthchil-
dren.html.
258. See, e.g., Van Lier, supra note 88, at 10-11.
259. See Walter C. Jones, More Parents Using Vouchers for Disabled Kids, ATHENS BANNER-
HERALD (May 10, 2009), available at onlineathens.com (quoting Dana Tofig, a spokesman for
the Georgia Department of Education, as saying that if students using vouchers "transfer in
midyear, they lose the right to obtain vouchers in the future. The law requires a child be in pub-
lic school special ed the entire year before applyingi.").
260. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 29 (quoting one of the two staff members responsible for
the Ohio Autism Scholarship).
[Vol. 39, No. 3
Vouchers for Students with Disabilities 333
and obviates the need for additional state oversight.26 ' There is clear evi-
dence suggesting that special needs vouchers are popular with many par-
ents of children with disabilities, and the overwhelming majority of
voucher participants are pleased with these programs. 262 Any program
that enhances the satisfaction of participants requires careful scrutiny
before modification or cessation. There is a real and significant thera-
peutic value to providing the parents of children with disabilities with a
sense of control over their children's future and positive belief in the
educational outcomes that are offered.263 These parents exist in stressful
environments that often times feel overwhelming due to the needs of
their children.26 These feelings are exacerbated by school districts that
often are focused on minimizing the costs of special education and relat-
ed services rather than maximizing the potential of each child with dis-
abilities. Providing these parents with options that do not require expen-
sive, protracted negotiations with public schools is important and should
be welcomed among the disability rights community.
Parental satisfaction with voucher programs, however, is far from uni-
versal. In Utah, for example, only 482 out of 700 total scholarship recip-
ients remained in the program between the program's inception in 2005
and the time of an audit in January 2008. Although the auditors "believe
this reflects satisfaction with the program," a 31% attrition rate is not
insubstantial over this relatively short period of time, particularly in a
state which allows students never educated in a public setting to receive
261. See, e.g., Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at 23 ("the best indicator of the
success of this program is parental response"); No Complaints, or Else, PALM BEAcH POST 10A
(August 10, 2004) (critiquing Florida Department of Education's assertion that "voucher schools
don't need the same oversight as public schools because voucher parents are best able to recog-
nize [student] success.").
262. See, e.g., id; Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at iii (stating that partici-
pating parents "are overwhelmingly in favor of the program and find it a success"); Van Lier,
supra note 88, at 27; Weidner, supra note 205, at xii (study finding that McKay parents "were
more satisfied with the schools their children attend, with the information they had, and with the
sources they used than were public school respondents.").
263. See Sarah Hamlyn-Wright et al., Locus of Control Fails to Mediate Between Stress and
Anxiety and Depression in Parents of Children with a Developmental Disorder, 11 AunsM 489,
490 (2007) (noting studies finding that "one important factor known to mediate the relationship
between stress and depression or anxiety in... .various groups of care givers is locus of control
-i.e. the predisposition to perceive events as under one's own (internal) control or as controlled
by other (external) factors").
264. See, e.g., Frank J. Floyd and Erin M. Gallagher, Parental Stress, Care Demands, and
Use of Support Services for School-Age Children with Disabilities and Behavior Problems, 68
FAmI~ RELATIONS 359 (Oct. 1997) ("Previous research documents that the special child care
demands faced by the parents of children with disabilities can cause significant stress for the par-
ents and significant disruption in family relationships.").
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funding.265 Significantly, 37% of those who withdrew from the program
did so because the private school did not meet their child's needs or was
located too far from the family home.2"
The surveys relied upon by voucher supporters, moreover, provide
less information than might appear at first glance. It is notable that they
look only to the satisfaction of those parents who are participating or
have participated in the relevant programs. These parents are those most
likely to be unhappy with the provision of services in the public schools,
and therefore are correspondingly more appreciative of any exit option
offered, however limited. 2 67 Such surveys do not take into account the
feeling of the vast majority of parents of children with disabilities who
remain in public school, either because no feasible alternatives exist, or
because of a belief in public education. Rating the success of a program
only on those who will benefit from its availability presents a mixed pic-
ture at best. One might expect that those who benefit from a tax-break
for the wealthy would be very pleased by the program. That result, how-
ever, says nothing about either the satisfaction levels of those who did
not receive the break or its consequences for the national economy.
In some cases, moreover, parental satisfaction with voucher programs
may ironically stem in part from the absence of meaningful accounta-
bility measures. It is very difficult for many parents to independently
evaluate their child's academic progress once he or she progresses
beyond basic skill development in elementary school." As a result,
many will rely heavily on feedback from school professionals reporting
their child's growth and academic performance. Problematically,
schools participating in voucher programs have an incentive to artifi-
cially inflate assessment measures in order to keep students enrolled. A
265. Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at 7-8. Although Utah is the only state
to currently re-evaluate eligibility every three years, the short window evaluated in the audit
would not reflect changes due to loss of eligibility. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-la-704(6)(a).
266. Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at 27.
267. See, e.g., id. at 25 (noting that most parents surveyed whose children participated in the
scholarship program reported they "were dissatisfied with their child's public school").
268. See, e.g., Jennifer Deplanty et al., Perceptions of Parent Involvement in Academic
Achievement, 100 J. EDUC. RESEARCH 361, 362 (July/August 2007) ("Parent involvement
may... decrease as students move from elementary into junior high school because parents are
less knowledgeable in some of the academic subject areas... As a result, less educated parents
might shift their attention away from school because they feel inadequate when helping children
with homework") (internal citations omitted); Laurence Steinberg, BEYOND THE CLASSROOM:
WHY SCHOOL REFoRm HAs FAILED AND WHAT PARES NEED To Do 17 (Simon & Schuster 1996)
(study finding that nearly 33% of all high school students reported that "their parents have no idea
how they are doing in school").
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parent receiving a report of academic progress is far less likely to
remove a child than one receiving indicators of academic failure or stag-
nation. In some cases, parents may only learn of their child's continuing
educational difficulties upon changing academic settings. In Florida, for
example, there are reports of McKay scholarship students who received
high grades in private schools only to find that they were several grade
levels behind when returning to public school.269
B. Global Concerns with Voucher Programs for Students with
Disabilities
Programmatic concerns, however significant, can be modified and
altered by legislatures. Many of the issues discussed above could be alle-
viated by implementing accountability measures to ensure that students
with disabilities are not simply provided with additional choices, but
with choices that have a meaningful chance to improve educational out-
comes for every voucher participant. Ohio, for example, has provided
for some meaningful accountability standards in its voucher program to
provide for more consistent services."' The state also provides a high
degree of financial support to parents, ensuring that parents have more
options with respect to their child's education.27'
Within existing programs, moreover, there indisputably are many stu-
dents with disabilities who are benefiting from their state's special needs
voucher programs. Many will be served well by dedicated teaching pro-
fessionals in quality educational placements tailored to meet their
instructional needs. The IDEA's legal protections do not guarantee the
assistance of caring administrators and effective teachers in public class-
rooms, as is made abundantly clear in the horror stories told by some
parents of children with disabilities. Regardless of the law's dictates,
there will always be some school districts and administrators more con-
cerned with meeting the technical requirements of the IDEA than the
needs of the students they serve.
269. See, e.g., Kimberly Miller, Voucher Controls Within Reach After 2 Years of Slipping
Away, PALM BEA~c POST, Apr. 28, 2006, at IA. ("I guess I was stupid. I'm glad he was on the
honor roll, but I would have much rather them be truthful.").
270. See infra II.B.
271. Notably, however, one recent study concluded that the program, despite its cap of
$20,000, disproportionately serves wealthy families. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 16.
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In short, it is indisputable that some children with disabilities will ben-
efit, possibly significantly, from the implementation of voucher pro-
grams. From this reality, one might readily conclude that vouchers pro-
vide a welcome alternative for this population. It may be, however, that
the benefits secured by these children are bought at a cost to the major-
ity of children with disabilities who remain in public school. The
remainder of this article explores global concerns with voucher pro-
grams in an attempt to assess the legitimacy of such concerns.
1. Diminished Public Resources to Educate Children with Severe
Disabilities
It is relatively clear that special needs voucher programs primarily
benefit students with mild to moderate disabilities. In Georgia, for exam-
ple, nearly 68% of those served in the program were eligible because of
learning disabilities (SLD), speech-language impairments, or other
health impairments (OHI), a category that includes children with atten-
tion-deficit disorder.72 This is true as well for Florida, where 62% of stu-
dents participating in the 2008-2009 school year fell into these same cat-
egories.273 One study in Ohio concluded that students with severe autism
would have difficulty using vouchers because a significant percentage of
providers worked exclusively with less severely disabled children.74
These participation rates are not surprising given, as noted earlier, that
many students participating in voucher programs enroll in schools with
few or no specialized services for students with disabilities. These
schools may offer lower class sizes and personal attention, but they are
rarely equipped to handle the more demanding needs of children with
272.2007-2008 GEORGIA SPEaAL NEEDs SCHOLARSWup (GSNS) YEAR END REPoR" 6, available
at http://www.doe.k12.ga.usDMGetDocument.aspx/End%20of%2OYear%20Report%20-%
202007%20-%202008%20Georgia%20Special %20Needs%20Scholarship%20End%
20of%20Year%2OReport-%20report%20sent%20to%20Legislature%20120308.pdf?p=
6CC6799F8C1371F6E1764D2812D6897813D7F6853FDFD50ADA3C9695FC2D495E&Type=D.
273. See McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 4. Notably, however, one study
of Duval County reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the number of mild and moder-
ately disabled students taking McKay scholarships was equivalent to their percentage in the pub-
lic school population, while students with very severe needs opted for McKay vouchers at one
and one-third times their representation in the student population. See Weidner, supra note 205,
at 93. The author noted, however, that "the distributions of the [severity] in this study do not
match the distributions found in the statewide McKay datal.]" Id.
274. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 10 (finding that 31% of providers "accept only less severe-
ly disabled children").
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severe impairments.275 Particularly in rural areas, there are few, if any,
private schools providing services to children with significant disabili-
ties .276 Many of those that do, moreover, can require tuition and fees well
in excess of the modest amount of funding provided by public vouch-
ers.2" In Georgia, for example, the tuition for many schools specializing
in the education of students with disabilities easily exceeds $20,000,
while the average award provided to students in 2008-2009 was
$6,331.278
The predominance of mildly-impaired students in voucher programs,
although predictable, is problematic in many respects. As moderately-
impaired students elect to exit the public schools, the population of stu-
dents who remain behind disproportionately will have more severe dis-
abilities. These children are likely to have the most intense needs for
specialized instruction and related services in the school environment,
requiring a potentially significant expenditure of resources. The pool of
funding available to meet these needs, however, becomes smaller as stu-
dents exit through the voucher option.
Theoretically, a school district will only lose that state money which
otherwise would have been spent to educate a student when he or she
elects to accept a private school voucher. Some school districts have
reported, however, that state vouchers also divert local money.279
Significantly, moreover, there are a number of fixed costs incurred by
districts for the education of students with disabilities that do not easily
alter with a smaller population. Districts will incur training and salary
expenses for instructional staff regardless of class size. In most cases,
they must retain the services of speech-language pathologists, occupa-
tional therapists and other therapeutic professionals on staff whether or
not they serve a large or small pool of children. 20 The costs of adminis-
275. See, e.g., Greene and Winters, supra note 9, at *6 ("Among the McKay-eligible, stu-
dents diagnosed with SLD ... likely have the greatest access to private school alternatives. Some
SLD students are not much different from non-disabled students, and thus pose fewer education-
al challenges for private schools.").
276. See, e.g., Georgia Dept. of Education, supra note 77, at 17 (identifying heavy urban
concentration of schools participating in state's voucher program).
277. Id. at 14-16.
278. See id. at 2.
279. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 36-37.
280. See Jay P. Greene, Fixing Special Education, 82 PEABODY J. EDUC. 703,709-710 (Oct.
2007) (explaining that in special education, "most administrative expenses are fixed costs that do
not increase with every new child. Schools need administrators, secretaries, psychologists,
speech therapists, and other specialists, whether their special-education caseload is low or
high.").
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trators to engage in child-find activities and assist in IEP development
likewise are not subject to incremental reduction as individual students
leave the district.
This problem is exacerbated by the potential loss of federal IDEA
funds to students with disabilities in private school. OCR has taken the
position that states must include voucher students when determining the
proportionate IDEA funds to allocate to private school students with dis-
abilities.28' Because most private school students have relatively mild
disabilities, this operates as a transfer of wealth away from students with
the most significant needs toward those for whom a small classroom and
individualized attention may suffice to address their educational chal-
lenges. In Palm Beach County, Florida alone, this resulted in the re-
direction of $1.25 million to serve private school students with disabili-
ties.2" District officials have testified that in the absence of the McKay
scholarship, this "money would have been spent on students enrolled at
public schools with more severe disabilities. ' 283 This raises difficult
issues of equitable distribution that ultimately may pit the parents of
children with severe impairments against those of children with more
moderate limitations in the competition for scarce resources. Policies
which place this vulnerable population at odds with one another weaken
their ability to advocate effectively for all children with disabilities.
Further complicating this issue, some states do not impose re-eligibility
provisions for students with disabilities accepting private school vouchers.
Although the IDEA requires students in public schools to be reassessed at
least every three years 284 a student who accepts a voucher in first grade in
Florida and Georgia will receive his allocation of state dollars and divert
federal funding through high school graduation whether or not he contin-
ues to qualify as a child with a disability. There is no inquiry into the
child's growth and development over what potentially could be the child's
entire academic career. This approach endorses an imagery of disability
that is static and unchanging, a particularly faulty assumption in the con-
281. See infra at III.B.1.
282. Special Education Today: Across the Nation (May 10, 2006), specialedconnection.com.
283. Id. (noting that the county "would have used that money for teacher aides, crisis inter-
vention teachers, and substitute teachers who govern classes while special education teachers are
in training.").
284. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
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text of child development.' It is likely to result in a dilution of public
funding that may otherwise be available to serve children with disabilities.
This apparently is true even in Utah, which requires re-assessment of
voucher students every three years. Auditors in that state found that some
students continued to receive Carson Smith scholarships even though "the
disability that qualified them ceased to exist."'
Even in the absence of this oversight, the cost of administering vouch-
er programs is not inconsequential, and the question must be posed
whether funding is better spent on administration than educating stu-
dents with disabilities. The availability of vouchers is likely to increase
child-find expenditures as an increasing number of parents request eval-
uations in the hopes of securing private school funding. Although many
of these children would otherwise be entitled to and have sought assis-
tance, in some cases such requests may come from parents who other-
wise had no intention of enrolling their children in public schools. A sig-
nificant percentage of time and money also will inevitably be directed to
students who do not qualify for coverage.2 Administrative costs are
likely to rise even in those states which choose to retain control over the
IEP to some extent. In Ohio, which requires an annual IEP meeting for
voucher recipients, districts incur higher meeting costs because schools
must coordinate with outside service providers, who frequently provide
insufficient information to conduct meaningful reviews.2
Administrative costs are a particularly significant issue in Utah, which
permits students in private schools to apply for voucher funding. Utah
has estimated that "loin average, districts spend about $485 and 13.9
hours per.., applicant in conducting assessment tests, reviewing assess-
ments, meeting with other assessment team parties, and performing
other administrative tasks." '289 More than 60% of students accepting
285. See Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at 33 (finding that several students
received money during the three-year period of the scholarship although "the disability that qual-
ified them ceased to exist"). If this is true in a state that requires an eligibility assessment every
three years, one could speculate the numbers will be quite significant in those that have no re-eli-
gibility provisions at all.
286. Id. at 33.
287. Id. at 28 (noting that at least 37 students were denied eligibility during the 2006-2007
school year).
288. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 32 (noting that "this can mean up to 25 hours to chase down
reports from providers and write one IEP").
289. Report to the Utah Legislature, supra note 56, at ii.
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Carson Smith scholarships were not enrolled in public school at the time
of the scholarship application."9 Money spent to educate private school
students with no prior connection to public education is a direct loss of
revenue available to provide special education and related services to
children in public schools with few private options.29'
2. Increased Segregation of Students with Disabilities in Public
Schools
As an increasing number of moderately-impaired students elect to
take vouchers, the potential exists for special education in public schools
to change from a set of services provided to a place for students with dis-
abilities. Children with more moderate impairments have the greatest
likelihood of succeeding in a general education classroom. The loss of
these students from public schools will increasingly segregate students
with disabilities from their typically-performing peers, exacerbating dis-
ability discrimination and eroding many of the gains secured since pas-
sage of the IDEA.
Society has relegated people with disabilities to the margins of the
community throughout its history. The existence of any physical or men-
tal impairment has been sufficient to place a child with a disability into
the category of "other" and well outside the normal social order.2" Until
the 1970s, children with disabilities were often restricted to segregated
classrooms or excluded from public school altogether.293 The require-
ment in EAHCA and IDEA to educate children with disabilities in the
least restrictive environment reflected a monumental shift in this regard.
Placing children with disabilities into mainstream classrooms simulta-
290. Id. at 7, 9-10 (finding in an audit of 5 districts that 62% of those receiving scholarships
were enrolled in private school at the time of the application). There is some evidence in Ohio
suggesting that a number of participating students would have remained in a private setting
whether or not the voucher was provided. Notably, 50% of participants are preschoolers with no
prior experience with public education. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 38.
291. Some critics have argued that voucher programs have the potential to create resources
for students remaining in public school to the extent that "the cost of educating disabled students
truly exceeds the funding provided[.]" See Greene and Winters, supra note 9, at *3. Notably,
however, there appears to be no empirical support for this proposition.
292. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 2, at 1180 (detailing historical exclusion of people with
disabilities from mainstream society).
293. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 349, 355-56 (1990)
(discussing "legislative, administrative, and judicial activity either permitting or requiring the
exclusion of these children from public education" prior to 1975).
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neously expanded their educational opportunities and diminished the
stigma of otherness and isolation that formerly served as the hallmarks
of public education."'
There is little doubt that children with less severe impairments have
the best chance for meaningful integration and success in general edu-
cation classrooms. Many children with learning disabilities, for exam-
ple, can succeed in general education when provided with additional
individualized instruction or alternative methods of delivery that often
enhance the learning opportunities of other children in the classroom.29 5
The daily interaction of these students with their typical peers diminish-
es the stigma of otherness associated with disability and normalizes chil-
dren's understanding of impairments.2%6
It is this same category of students, however, that is most likely to par-
ticipate in special needs vouchers.29 If these students depart public
schools in significant numbers, it will negatively impact the normaliza-
tion of disability in education and American society more generally.2"
Children with severe disabilities are more likely to require self-
contained classrooms to meet their educational needs. Although these
children are likely to interact on occasion with students in general edu-
cation, they are less likely to do so on a footing of peer or friend.2 9 As
in the past, the identification of disability becomes tied to children who
are separate and apart from the general school population, causing the
stigma of disability potentially to rise.3°°
294. Hensel, supra note 2, at 1180-1181.
295. See, e.g., Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, lime to Make Education "Special" Again,
in REFHINKING SPECIAL EDUCAION FOR A NEW CENT RY 23,42 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al., eds.,
2001).
296. See Hensel, supra note 2, at 1181; Joshua K. Harrower, Educational Inclusion of
Children with Severe Impairments, I J. PosrwE BEll. INTERVENTIONS 215,217 (1999) (discussing
study finding a "significant increase in positive attitudes toward children with severe learning
disabilities among the children in the integrated classroom"). Cf. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 41
(concluding Ohio's Autism Scholarship is not "sound education policy" because its exclusionary
aspects "undermine the idea of public schools as a place where a diverse group of children can
learn together and begin to create a common civic culture.").
297. See infra at IV.B.1.
298. See Van Lier, supra note 88, at 27 (discussing the impact of the inclusion of children
with disabilities on non-typical peers).
299. See David S. Palmer et al., Taking Sides: Parent iews on Inclusion for Their Children
with Severe Disabilities, 67 EXCEIrONAL CmwDREN 467, 467-68 (2001) (noting the increased
trend toward inclusion for students with disabilities and parental concerns about socialization);
Harrower, supra note 296, at 216-17 (discussing peer relationships between students with severe
disabilities and typical peers in middle and high schools).
300. See Hensel, supra note 2, at 1181.
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It may be that such concerns are largely overstated because the num-
ber of students participating in voucher programs is low relative to the
number of eligible students with disabilities. Most programs, however,
are in their early days. Florida's program has experienced "remarkable
growth" in its voucher program over the last decade."' The McKay
scholarship, moreover, has been identified as having "the largest poten-
tial number of participants of any voucher or tax-credit program in the
nation."" If its example holds true for other states, in some grades as
many as 12% of the eligible special needs students could ultimately exit
into private schools.3
It is also significant to note that Ohio's program has resulted in the
segregation of those children accepting vouchers. 75% of children elect-
ing vouchers use providers "created to primarily or exclusively serve
disabled students."" As a result, these students are largely precluded
from interacting with their typical peers on a regular basis."5 Although
parents may justifiably be more concerned about the services provided
to their children than their degree of integration, this reflects a troubling
step away from the LRE requirement of the IDEA and has the potential
to negatively impact students' educational development.?°
3. "Meaningful" Choices: The Implications of Wealth & Race
Critics of voucher programs contend that they primarily serve affluent
families who can afford to pay private school tuition and fees in excess
of the scholarships awarded by states.3"7 Because only a small percent-
age of minority children with disabilities fall into this category, there is
concern that vouchers will disproportionately aid white students with
impairments.308 The population remaining in public schools correspond-
ingly will be made up of minority families and the poor.
The evidence on the ability of less affluent students to benefit from
voucher programs is mixed. There is an encouraging report in Florida
301. See McKay Scholarships, supra note 36.
302. Enlow, supra note 10, at 26.
303. See McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 2. See also Report to the Utah
Legislature, supra note 56, at 5 (predicting "the Carson Smith Scholarship program will contin-
ue to grow.").
304. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 25.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See Greene and Winters, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing critiques of McKay program).
308. Id.
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that identifies 42% of the students receiving McKay scholarships as eli-
gible to receive free or reduced-price lunch, an indicator used by many
scholars to suggest a low socio-economic status .3° There is equally sig-
nificant evidence, however, which supports a contrary finding, even
within Florida. Studies of McKay parents in Duval County have found,
for example, that they have "higher incomes [and] more education...
compared to the public school[s] ,''  "lend[ing] credence to the argu-
ment that vouchers, without income restrictions and without restrictions
on the level of tuition charged by private schools, would be used by
more advantaged parents . . . ."I" In Georgia, only 32% of those who
elected vouchers were eligible for free or reduced lunch,31 1 which is
noticeably less than the 52% of Georgia's public school children who are
classified as low-income."' A study in Ohio likewise reported that stu-
dents in affluent communities "tend to take advantage of the autism
voucher to a greater extent" than those in less affluent communities. 314
The author concluded that "it seems inevitable that the program will
damage Ohio's public system" because it would "leav[e] more disad-
vantaged students in the public system. '31 5
The participation of minority students would seem more positive.
Slightly more than half of all students receiving vouchers in Florida fall
in this category, which is roughly equivalent to the percentage of special
education students in the state.316 In Georgia, 41% of those participating
in 2008-2009 were Black or Hispanic, suggesting that its program does
not unduly screen out minority students.317 Although such reports are
encouraging, there is some evidence to suggest that this population is dis-
proportionately served by religious schools.3I8 A Duval County, Florida
309. McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 3.
310. Weidner, supra note 205, at xiii.
311. Virginia R. Weidner & Carolyn D. Herrington, Are Parents Informed Consumers:
Evidence from the Florida McKay Scholarship Program, 81 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 27,32-33 (2006).
312. Georgia Dept. of Educ., supra note 77, at 5.
313. Steve Suitts, Crisis of the New Majority: Low-Income Students in the South's Public
Schools, SOUTHERN SPACES, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.southernspaces.org/contents/
2008/suitts/la.htm.
314. Van Lier, supra note 88, at 16.
315. Id. at 1.
316. McKay Quarterly Report 2009, supra note 27, at 3. See also Sara Mead, Information
Underload: Florida's Flawed Special-Ed Voucher Program, EDUCATION SECTOR REPoRrs, June
2007, at 3.
317. Georgia 2008-2009 Preliminary Report, supra note 77, at 4.
318. Weidner and Herrington, supra note 311, at 37 (concluding that "African American and
Hispanic students make up greater percentages of the private religious schools' voucher popula-
tion than they represent in the McKay sample as a whole.").
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study found that only 15% of African Americans and 1.5% percent of
Hispanic students in the sample attended non-religious schools while
using McKay.319 This may be explained by the fact that minorities are dis-
proportionately represented in low socio-economic households,320 and
that religious schools can be among the most affordably-priced private
schools, particularly in urban areas.' Although this correlation may be
benign, it is troubling to the extent that many religious schools offer no
specialized programming, creating the risk that they are less likely to
meet the needs of special education students."2 This conclusion is sup-
ported to some extent by a study finding that "whites were moderately
more satisfied than nonwhites with services addressing the child's dis-
ability and with teacher quality." 323 If correct, this suggests that those
most at risk from voucher programs are disproportionately minorities and
the poor. Further study is needed to determine the significance of these
concerns.
Advocates of vouchers have argued that the existence of such pro-
grams will lead to an expansion of private schools capable of educating
children with special needs. There is no question that the number of
schools willing to serve voucher students seems to grow in each year of
a program's existence. 24 This growth, however, is no assurance of qual-
ity in the absence of clear accountability measures. Florida, for example,
has experienced some difficulty ensuring the integrity of its participat-
ing schools, particularly in the early years of its program .325 It remains to
be seen whether schools entering the market will ensure that all vouch-
er participants have an equal opportunity for individualized instruction
and quality programming.
319. Id. at 37-38.
320. See Sarah Fass and Nancy K. Cauthen, Who are America's Poor Children?, Fact Sheet,
National Center for Children in Poverty, October 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.nccp.org/publications/ pdf/text_843.pdf (reporting that 34% and 29% of Black and
Hispanic children live in poverty respectively, compared to only 10% of white children).
321. See, e.g., Gerald M. Cattaro, Catholic Schools Enduring Presence in North America,
35 EDUC. AND URBAN Soc. 100 (2002) (noting that Catholic schools did not abandon education
in urban society); Martha Minow, Vouching for Equality, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at B5
("Unlike higher-income, white families, most poor black and Hispanic families cannot choose the
neighborhoods they live in. So the chief route out of local public schools in urban areas is through
parochial-usually Catholic-schools that are relatively affordable.").
322. See infra n. 218.
323. Greene and Forster, supra note 12, at 6.
324. See infra Part II.A.
325. See S.V. Date, Private Educators Seek to Limit Vouchers to Accredited Schools, PALM
BEACH POST March 24, 2004, at 6A; Kimberly Miller & S.V. Date, Brokers Get a Piece of School
Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST, August 10, 2003, at IA.
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4. Enhanced Tension with School Administrators and General
Education
Proponents of vouchers suggest that by allowing parents to exit pub-
lic schools on demand, they will decrease the tension that currently
exists between parents and school administrators. 326 There no longer will
be a need for protracted arguments about whether or not services will be
provided-if parents are unhappy, they can find a school that better suits
their child without the need for litigation or expense. A close look
reveals, however, that voucher programs may simply shift this tension to
the eligibility determination, which has the potential to deny services to
students who otherwise would be eligible under the IDEA. In addition,
because the profile of the majority of students using vouchers is rela-
tively similar to that of students in general education, it has the potential
to create friction between the parents of children in special and general
education that may ultimately diminish the resources directed to stu-
dents with disabilities.
Schools have an incentive to police the eligibility determination more
carefully when a positive result carries the potential for loss of revenue. In
some respects, this may be a positive development. Critics have argued
that incentives exist under the current system to over-identify children with
disabilities, especially those with mild impairments.327 For some groups of
children, moreover, enhanced scrutiny is likely to lead to few changes in
eligibility. Students with tangible physical impairments, for example, are
rarely the subject of disputes over entitlement to IDEA services.
There is a great deal of controversy, however, over the identification
of students with learning disabilities, the largest disability category in
many states.3 8 Because eligibility depends to a large extent on actions
taken by teachers and administrators, the potential for conflict with par-
ents is heightened and potentially significant. In 2004, Congress amend-
ed the IDEA to provide that districts "shall not be required" to use the
severe discrepancy model of diagnosing learning disabilities. 29 The dis-
326. See, e.g., Greene and Forster, supra note 12, at 2.
327. See Marcus A. Winters and Jay P. Greene, How Special Ed Vouchers Keep Kids From
Being Mislabeled as Disabled," MANHATrAN INSTrrTE 1 (August 2009) (noting that the growth
in special education "may be the result of financial and other incentives that spur school systems
to classify struggling students who may not truly suffer from a mental or physical disability as
learning-disabled, and thus entitled, under various state and federal mandates, to receive more
than ordinary attention, for which the school systems in question are compensated.").
328. Id.
329. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(A).
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crepancy model will identify learning disabilities when there is a signif-
icant deviation between a student's intellectual ability and his or her
actual academic performance.3" In lieu of this model, Congress encour-
aged districts to employ "a process that determines if the child responds
to scientific, research-based intervention as a part of the evaluation pro-
cedures."33' Commonly referred to as "RTI," or Response to
Intervention, this diagnostic model is triggered when a student experi-
ences academic delays in the classroom, at which point teachers imple-
ment a series of research-based interventions to remediate the difficul-
ties. Because students without disabilities are believed to be able to
make satisfactory progress when presented with quality instruction and
remedial services, a student's failure to respond to the interventions is
viewed as evidence that an underlying learning disability exists32
Given the rise of the RTI method of identifying students with learning
disabilities,333 the disconnect between school districts looking to pre-
serve state funding and the need for services of children with significant
learning issues may grow. Diagnosing SLD through the RTI method can
be difficult for administrators." The effectiveness of this diagnostic
model depends to a large extent on teacher training and administrative
willingness to follow through with progressive interventions. 35 The
potential for significant delays between the onset of difficulty in the
classroom and the identification of disability is very real despite the
IDEA's general mandate that eligibility assessments take place within
sixty days.336 Districts cognizant of the fact that the identification of a
learning disability potentially results in a loss of funds may have little
incentive to conclude the process or move it forward expeditiously, rais-
ing tensions between parents and administrators.
330. See, e.g., Suzanne Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education:
A Practical Guide to ADA Requirements, 32 J. LAw & EDUC. 217, 229-30 (2003) (describing
aptitude achievement discrepancy model).
331.20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B).
332. See Hensel, supra note 2, at 1160-61 (describing RTI model).
333. See, e.g., Report to the Utah legislature, supra note 56, at 31-32 (noting the increased
usage of RTI to determine eligibility for learning disabilities in Utah and noting that this approach
"is the current focus in helping struggling students").
334. Id. at 32 ("Implementing the RTI method for SLD eligibility determination can be dif-
ficult.").
335. See, e.g., id. (concluding that "[i]mplementing the RTI method.. .can be difficult" in
part "because it lacks development.").
336. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I).
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A recent study of the McKay scholarship supports this conclusion,
finding a 15% reduction in the probability that a fourth, fifth, or sixth
grade student will be identified as having an SLD in districts with pri-
vate schools that compete for McKay students . 3 The authors suggest
that this is a positive result because "[t]here is reason to believe that the
subjective nature of the SLD diagnosis has led to substantial overclassi-
fication" of students with learning disabilities?38 They conclude that
voucher programs keep children from being mislabeled as disabled. 39
It is equally possible, however, that the reduction in diagnoses of SLD
is a response by schools to a loss of funding rather than a reflection of
better eligibility assessments.' There is nothing in the study to suggest
that the students denied coverage were not, in fact, eligible for services
under the criteria identified for SLD in the IDEA. To the extent that
voucher programs create impediments to students with legitimate, intan-
gible disabilities receiving services, they are highly problematic and
contrary to the legislative goal of serving all students with disabilities.
Voucher programs are also likely to create tension between the parents
of general education students and those of students with disabilities,
which may in turn lead to diminished resources for special education. In
the absence of clear arguments reflecting that children with disabilities
are differently situated, it is highly problematic to provide school choice
for this group of children to the exclusion of all others. As discussed ear-
lier, the majority of children using special needs vouchers are matricu-
lating into programs which offer little more than smaller class size and
enhanced personal attention?' There are many general education stu-
dents languishing from large class size and poor instruction that would
similarly benefit from such programs. This point is not lost on critics of
special education or general education parents, who note the irony of
some legislators' support for special needs vouchers at the same time
they reject legislation mandating smaller class sizes in public school .42
337. Winters and Greene, supra note 327, at 9.
338. Id. at 6.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 9 (acknowledging that "[oine could interpret the result" in this manner).
341. See infra VIA.1.
342. See, e.g., Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons From Special
Education Legislation, 29 FoRDHAM URa. LJ. 759,761 (2001) (arguing that advocates "should not
square off and fight over funds or services, playing tug of war between 'regular' and 'special' edu-
cation or 'regular education kids' and 'special education kids.' Instead, we should use available
funds in inclusive ways .... "). Cf. Mark Kelman, The Moral Foundations of Special Education
Law, in RErHmKNG SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEw CENTuRy 77, 78 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., Andrew
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It may be that this friction is the intentional design of the school
choice movement. The evidence strongly suggests that many voucher
supporters have focused on children with disabilities not out of concern
for this population, but because of the political viability of using vulner-
able children as the standard bearers for such legislation. 3 While this
approach may benefit the school choice movement, it does lasting dam-
age to the community of students with disabilities. Outside of the vouch-
er context, a number of critics have argued that special education is
draining the resources of general education, leading to calls to restrict
eligibility under the IDEA.' Singling out students with disabilities for
unwarranted preferential treatment exacerbates this conflict and may
ultimately lead to diminished resources for special education in public
schools."5 Any program that pits parents against each other rather than
working for the benefit of all children should be carefully scrutinized.
This is especially true when the program has an admitted political pur-
pose that may have little to do with its intended beneficiaries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The push for voucher programs as an alternative to special education
and related services in the public schools is growing across the United
States. If the genuine goal of voucher programs is to enhance the educa-
tional advancement of students with disabilities, they must be grounded
in meaningful evidence of programmatic superiority for this population
rather than long-standing political arguments on the merits of school
choice. Although some individual children will indisputably benefit as a
result of such programs, the lack of programmatic accountability and
loss of legal protection strongly suggests that many will be left worse off
when using vouchers. Those students with disabilities who remain in
J. Rotherham and Charles R. Hokanson, Jr., eds., 2001) (arguing that "we should be... wary of a
system that forbids us from counting the educational interests of 'mainstream' students just as wor-
thy as those of pupils with disabilities").
343. See infra Part 1.
344. See Robert Worth, The Scandal of Special Ed, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1999, at 34
(arguing that "[in order to pay for special ed's enormous, ineffectual bureaucracy and
skyrocketing enrollments, school districts are being forced to cheat their conventional students").
345. Hensel, supra note 2, at 1179-1180 (discussing trend toward restrictive eligibility). See
also Van Lier, supra note 88, at 41 ("Rather than supporting a system that exacerbates inequity,
public resources should be directed toward strengthening services for all.").
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public schools, moreover, will be increasingly segregated from their typ-
ical peers and have diminished resources available to serve their needs.
The wide-spread dissatisfaction with the status quo for students with
disabilities is not a simple result of the public schools' inability to meet
the needs of these children. Instead, to a large extent, it is a product of
the public's unwillingness to make meeting the needs of such students a
priority. Legislators would be better served by looking to programs that
help all students with disabilities achieve their academic potential rather
than focusing on benefits for only a few.

